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ARTICLES
THE LAWYER'S DUTY TO WARN CLIENTS
ABOUT LIMITS
ON CONFIDENTIALITY
Lee A. Pizzimenti *
Remember, whatever you tell me is strictly confidential. I cannot
and will not divulge anything you say to anyone else without your
express permission.'
You should confide in [your] lawyer.... But you should also real-
ize that if your lawyer believes you intend to commit perjury, your
lawyer can report this to the judge .... 2
A lawyer may reveal ... [c]onfidences or secrets necessary to estab-
lish or collect his fee or to defend himself... against an accusation
of wrongful conduct.3
Although the duty to maintain confidences of a client is universally recog-
nized,4 limitations on that duty do exist.5 Yet, lawyers sometimes say noth-
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1. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELLING: A CLIENT
CENTERED APPROACH 108 (1977) (suggested statement to be given to clients to facilitate
discussion).
2. Ogletree, The Future of Defense Advocacy, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1903, 1904 (1988)
(suggested "Miranda" warning to arrestees).
3. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(4) (1980) (footnote
omitted) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
4. See infra notes 9-20 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 30-36, 103-15 and accompanying text.
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ing to clients about these limitations, 6 or misstate the scope of protection
confidentiality rules provide.7 As a result, a client may make statements he
would not have made had he known that his lawyer might later disclose
them.8 The ensuing client vulnerability to possible disclosures without his
permission has both legal and moral implications.
6. In a recent survey of attorneys, Professor Zacharias of Cornell Law School found that
22.6% "almost never" informed clients about confidentiality, and 59.7% stated they informed
clients in less than 50% of their cases. Of clients surveyed, 72.9% stated that their first attor-
ney did not tell them about confidentiality. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L.
REV. 351, 382-83 (1989). Inadequately informed clients seeking information from other
sources (such as friends, books or television) become misinformed. Id. at 383. In fact, 42.4%
of those surveyed believed that confidentiality requirements were absolute. Id. Although Pro-
fessor Zacharias points out that his survey is not dispositive given his small and homogeneous
subject group, his results clearly illustrate that some lawyers fail to inform clients or actively
misrepresent the law. See infra note 7.
7. Professor Zacharias' survey disclosed that 72.1% of lawyers surveyed "admitted that
they tell their clients 'only generally that all communications are confidential.' " Zacharias,
supra note 6, at 386. Only 27.8% routinely tell their clients that exceptions to the confidential-
ity rules exist. However, of the 59.7% of lawyers reporting that they inform clients about
confidentiality in less than 50% of their cases, 84.6% say only that "all communications are
confidential." Id. Of those lawyers who discuss confidentiality in response to direct questions
or to combat client reticence, 82.8% overstate the protection that statements will receive. Id,
Zacharias notes that lawyers should be especially sensitive to possible deception if clients have
expressed concern about confidentiality. Id. at 382-86. Because informed consent is required
when facts are material, Professor Zacharias is right. See infra notes 135-84 and accompany-
ing text. A client would probably not inquire about confidentiality unless he deemed it mate-
rial to his decisionmaking.
8. See Zacharias, supra note 6, at 386 n.174 (11.3% of uninformed clients would with-
hold information.) But see id. (11.8% of informed clients would withhold information).
Binder and Price explain that some clients only reluctantly discuss certain topics. If the law-
yer determines that she should pursue an issue, she may overcome the client's reluctance
through using "motivational" statements that express the lawyer's empathetic understanding.
D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 1, at 105. Next, the lawyer should make statements that
Binder and Price have coined as "facilitators," which outline the "reward" or benefit the par-
ties stand to gain by sharing information. Id. at 106. The following represents a typical facili-
tating statement: "The way you can best help yourself is by letting me know what happened.
Only if I have all the information can I adequately protect your interests." Id. Binder and
Price expressly state that assurances of confidentiality such as the above quoted facilitating
statement serve their purposes well. Id. at 108. See, e.g., supra note 1 and accompanying text.
See also A. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES 106-10
(1988) (stating that assurances of confidentiality help the lawyer assure client of her loyalty).
While this Article does not suggest that Binder and Price advocate deception, their attempts to
gather information from clients by facilitating conversation can mislead clients about the scope
of confidentiality. See also K. MANN, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 37 (1985) (criminal lawyers use
assurances of confidentiality to create rapport). Of course, it is not misleading to tell clients no
disclosures will be made if the attorney does not intend to make any disclosures. Although
Professor Amsterdam does not expressly state that he does not believe any disclosures should
be made, one can infer that view from his proposed statements that he will not share anything
the client reveals. A. AMSTERDAM, supra, at 106-10. This view will result in violation of the
ethical rules in those jurisdictions which mandate disclosures, see infra notes 34, 67, but some
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Section I of this Article outlines the current scope of confidentiality rules
and their exceptions. Sections II and III establish that failure to inform a
client about potential limitations on confidentiality and subsequent disclo-
sure by an attorney of information garnered during conversations with a
client probably do not raise constitutional questions or create civil liability.
However, active deception, or even negligent failure to provide sufficient in-
formation to assure informed consent, raises serious issues at the heart of the
attorney-client relationship. Section IV considers these issues of informed
consent and advocates that lawyers should presume that a discussion of the
limits on confidentiality is necessary. Attorneys should generally assume
that clients consider such information material to their decisionmaking and
inform clients of the potential for disclosure. The Article concludes with the
assertion that failure to inform should, where appropriate, provide a basis
for discipline or malpractice liability.
I. THE JUSTIFICATION AND LIMITS OF CONFIDENTIALITY
The requirement that a lawyer refrain from disclosing the confidences of
her client is a cornerstone of the attorney-client relationship.9 Legal ethics
codes include rules prohibiting disclosures within the narrow confines of the
attorney-client privilege ° and impose a broad ethical duty to refrain from
divulging nonprivileged information that the client would want withheld."1
lawyers may conclude the view is the best moral alternative. See infra notes 12, 32-33 and
accompanying text.
9. Michael Bayles outlined the basic duties of a professional: trustworthiness, honesty,
candor, competence, diligence, loyalty, fairness, and discretion. M. BAYLES, PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS 77-99 (2d ed. 1989). He noted that discretion is a broader requirement than maintain-
ing confidences, the underlying value of which is protection of privacy. Id. at 96. Bayles' view
runs parallel to the view of legal professional codes. See infra notes 10-11.
10. A court may not compel a lawyer to testify regarding matters protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton Rev. 1961). Yet, this privi-
lege only exists:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor in
his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.
Id. The attorney-client privilege exists in some form in every United States jurisdiction. C.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 250 (1986). For a discussion of the attorney-client privi-
lege and its limitations, see Zacharias, supra note 6, at 355 n.18; see generally C. WOLFRAM,
supra, at 250-301; Subin, The Lawyer as Superego. Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent
Harm, 70 IowA L. REV. 1091, 1106-19 (1985).
11. See, e.g., CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 37 (1908); MODEL CODE, supra
note 3, at DR 4-101; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES]. Disciplinary Rule (DR) 4-101 prohibits the revelation of "confidences,"
which are matters covered by the attorney-client privilege, and "secrets," which include "other
1990]
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Many commentators have written about the central importance of such
rules. 12
Scholars offer both deontological 3 and utilitarian 14 justifications for
maintaining client confidences. The classic deontological support for confi-
information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held invio-
late or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to
the client." MODEL CODE, supra note 3, at DR 4-101(A). Thus, for example, disclosures by
third parties regarding the client, while not protected by the attorney-client privilege, may be
protected from disclosure as a secret. Model Rule 1.6(A), similarly broad, prohibits a lawyer
from revealing information "relating to the representation," whether privileged or not. As the
comment to Rule 1.6 states:
The principle of confidentiality is given effect in two related bodies of law, the attor-
ney-client privilege (which includes the work product doctrine) in the law of evidence
and the rule of confidentiality established in professional ethics. The attorney-client
privilege applies in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as
a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client. The rule of
client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than those where evidence is
sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law. The confidentiality rule applies
not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all infor-
mation relating to the representation, whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose
such information except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional Con-
duct or other law.
MODEL RULES, supra, at Rule 1.6 comment 5. For a discussion of how the parallel develop-
ment of the privilege and of ethical duties has complicated analysis of disclosure of crimes and
frauds, see Subin, supra note 10, at 1106-19.
12. See, e.g., M. FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM (1975);
Landesman, Confidentiality and the Lawyer Client Relationship, in D. LUBAN, THE GOOD
LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 191 (1985); Abramovsky, A Case for
Increased Confidentiality, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 11 (1985); Callan & David, Professional
Responsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an Adversary
System, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 332 (1976); Kramer, Clients'Frauds and Their Lawyers' Obliga-
tions: A Study in Professional Irresponsibility, 67 GEO. L.J. 991 (1979); Lipman, The SEC's
Reluctant Police Force: A New Role For Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1974); Moore,
Limits to Attorney-Client Confidentiality A "Philosophically Informed" and Comparative Ap-
proach to Legal and Medical Ethics, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 177 (1985); Subin, supra note
10; Zacharias, supra note 6; Note, Client Fraud and the Lawyer - An Ethical Analysis, 62
MINN. L. REV. 89 (1977).
13. A deontological theory is based on the notion that the "right, the obligatory, and the
morally good" are not determined by reviewing the consequences of an action, but by review-
ing the intrinsic morality of the act itself. W. FRANKENA, ETHICS 15 (2d ed. 1973); see Moore,
supra note 12, at 188-99. There are two types of deontological theories: act deontology and
rule deontology. W. FRANKENA, supra, at 16-17. Act deontological theorists maintain that
one can make a judgment about morality only regarding individual situations and that no
generalized rules can be articulated. Id. Rule deontologists recognize that the standards of
right and wrong may be articulated through general rules. Id.
Kant is perhaps the best known rule deontologist. He has articulated a basic principle, the
categorical imperative, as the standard by which to determine which acts are moral: "Act as if
the maxim of your action were to become through your will a UNIVERSAL LAW OF NA-
TURE." I. KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 89 (H. Paton trans.
1964) (emphasis in original). Further, Kant adds to the imperative, "Act in such a way that
you always treat humanity ... never simply as means, but always at the same time as an end."
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dentiality rests upon the premise that, given our increasingly regulated and
Id. at 96 (footnotes omitted). Kant posits that human beings have a duty to act in a manner
consistent with the categorical imperative. See id. at 19.
The formula, simply put, asks whether the proposed rule may be equally applied to
everyone, without exception, and whether the proposed rule treats persons as ends in
themselves and not only as means to some end which is not their own. That is, we
must ask whether the proposed rule uses people... and whether the rule applies to
everyone ....
R. WRIGHT, HUMAN VALUES IN HEALTH CARE: THE PRACTICE OF ETHICS 32 (1987). One
should note that to pass this test, the actor must will the rule to be applied recognizing that he
may be on the "receiving end" of such a rule on some occasion. See W. FRANKENA, supra, at
25. For an excellent explanation of the categorical imperative, see T. MAPPES & J. ZEMBATY,
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 17-22 (2d ed. 1986).
Other deontological theorists have articulated somewhat more specific duties consistent with
the requirement of universal generalization and respect for persons. For example, W. D. Ross
finds duties of fidelity (based on implicit promises to tell the truth); reparation (based on a
previous wrongful act); gratitude (based on previous services on actor's behalf); justice (distri-
bution of happiness according to merit); non-maleficence (duty to refrain from harming
others); beneficence (duty to promote good, based on possibility we can improve the lives of
others); and self-improvement (based on ability to improve our own lives). W.D. Ross, THE
RIGHT AND THE GOOD 21 (1930).
The notion that human beings must be treated with respect and as ends in themselves leads
naturally to the idea that we have some inherent rights because of our status as human beings.
R. WRIGHT, supra, at 37. See also R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF
INFORMED CONSENT 3-22 (1986); W. FRANKENA, supra, at 45 (moral rights and duties are
correlative). Medieval scholars first articulated rights-based theories as resting on the notion
that God gives inherent rights and man cannot take them away. R. WRIGHT, supra, at 36-37.
The primary nontheological basis for inherent rights is found in the notion of autonomy: be-
cause human beings have the inherent right to self determination, it is improper to interfere
with that process. Id. at 37; see also R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra, at 7-9. For a discus-
sion of limits to the exercise of autonomous choice, see infra notes 25-29 and accompanying
text.
14. Utilitarianism centers upon the view that one determines the morality of an act with
reference to the principle of beneficence or utility, which provides that the moral end to be
sought is the greatest balance of good over evil. W. FRANKENA, supra note 13, at 34-35; see
also Moore, supra note 12, at 187. Act utilitarians posit that each act must be analyzed for its
excess of good over evil, and no generalizations from past experience can be made. W.
FRANKENA, supra note 13, at 32. Rule utilitarians emphasize the centrality of generalized
rules but, unlike deontological theorists, ask which rules promote the greatest good. Id. at 29.
Thus, act utilitarians consider the utility of an act, while rule utilitarians ask which rule has
the greatest utility. Among the problems with act utilitarianism is that it is simply impractica-
ble to calculate anew each time one performs an act. Id. at 36. (Of course, a similar argument
may be raised concerning act deontological theories.) Frankena concludes that rule utilitarian-
ism is also problematic because rules that have a net positive "goodness to badness" ratio may
nonetheless have an unjust impact upon certain individuals. Id. at 41. In other words, it is
possible that the principle of justice may trump the principle of utility. Id. Frankena suggests
a mixed deontological theory, that recognizes the importance of both beneficence and justice,
which he defines as equality of treatment. Id. at 43-52. Cf Moore, supra note 12, at 189 n.61
(discussing social contract theory of Rawls, who posits that justice requires that no person
should be disadvantaged by natural fortune or social circumstance).
Some describe utilitarian justifications as teleological or consequentialist justification. See
W. FRANKENA, supra note 13, at 13 (teleological moral theories state that the ultimate crite-
1990]
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complex society, attorneys are integral to clients' ability both to exercise
their right to autonomy and to avoid encroachment on that autonomy by the
state or third parties.' 5 Moreover, clients cannot fully exercise that auton-
omy unless they provide their lawyers with all relevant information, which
clients will not do absent the comfort of knowing that the attorneys will hold
their secrets inviolate.' 6
Furthermore, some have argued that clients have the inherent right to
privacy regarding their innermost thoughts and that those thoughts should
not lose their private character simply because clients are forced to exchange
information with an attorney to ensure the autonomy to which they are enti-
tled. '7 Finally, lawyers may have a duty to remain silent because they have
made a promise, either explicitly or implicitly because of their fiduciary rela-
tionship to clients, to keep client secrets.
18
rion of the morality of an act is the result brought about by that act). I prefer not to use
"consequentialist" nomenclature, because consequences are relevant, although clearly not dis-
positive, to all but the most strict deontological theorists. See infra notes 25-29 and accompa-
nying text. As Frankena states:
[I]t is not easy to deny, as pure deontologists do, that one of the things we ought to
do, other things being equal, is to bring about as much of a balance of good over evil
as we can, which even Ross ... [and others] allow. I find it hard to believe that any
action or rule can be right, wrong, or obligatory in the moral sense, if there is no
good or evil connected with it in any way, directly or indirectly. This does not mean
that there are no other factors affecting their rightness or wrongness, or that our only
duty is to pile up the biggest possible stockpile of what is good, as utilitarians think;
but it does imply that we do have, at least as one of our prima facie obligations, that
of doing something about the good and evil in the world.
W. FRANKENA, supra note 13, at 44.
15. See, e.g., A. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE xv (1982) (as an appellate attorney,
the author is often a client's last resort); M. FREEDMAN, supra note 12, at 5; Fried, The
Lawyer as Friend. The Moral Foundation of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060
(1976); Landesman, supra note 12, at 198-99. Landesman argues that maintaining confidences
is also based upon a duty to refrain from harming the speaker. Id. at 194; Pepper, The Law-
yer's Amoral Ethical Role. A Defense, A Problem and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 613.
16. See supra note 15 and sources cited therein.
17. R. WRIGHT, supra note 13, at 67, 73. Some controversy exists regarding the source of
the right to privacy. Professor Moore indicates that most scholars agree that this right is
derived from the right to autonomy. Moore, supra note 12, at 190-91. Moore notes that differ-
ing levels of protection of private matters may exist, depending on how close the information is
to the inner, core self. Id. For another explanation of the connection between privacy and
maintenance of individuality, see Wasserstrom, The Legal and Philosophical Foundations of the
Right to Privacy, in R. WRIGHT, supra note 13, at 169, 175. See also Landesman, supra note
12, at 197-98 (a speaker who shares embarrassing, guilty or dangerous information makes the
hearer part of his "extended self" because he needs a listener and wants to limit the use of the
information).
18. See R. WRIGHT, supra note 13, at 169-74. This created duty serves as an example of a
duty-based deontological theory. See supra note 13. See also Landesman, supra note 12, at
[Vol. 39:441
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Scholars also offer utilitarian justifications that focus on the consequences
of a rule requiring absolute protection of confidential information. They ar-
gue that clients will not receive competent legal services unless they provide
their attorneys with all relevant information. 9 Some suggest that promises
of absolute confidentiality will avoid harm to third parties. Such promises
allow clients to confide information regarding planned harmful acts; lawyers
may then dissuade clients from carrying them out.2°
Yet, recent scholarly literature challenges the legitimacy of deontological
arguments supporting an absolute prohibition of disclosure of confidences,
and it illustrates that empirical assumptions supporting utilitarian argu-
ments are overstated. For example, the utilitarian view that clients will not
fully unburden themselves absent a promise of confidentiality has dubious
empirical support.21 A recent study indicates that, although most attorneys
believe clients will not confide information absent assurances of confidential-
ity, many clients would reveal secrets to an attorney even if confidentiality
did not absolutely bar disclosure.22 Indeed, some scholars posit that clients
would talk freely to lawyers, despite limits on confidentiality, because of a
need to get competent legal service or for the cathartic effect of disclosure.
23
Moreover, the argument that information is critical to competent representa-
tion loses force when one considers that some lawyers deliberately instruct
their clients to refrain from disclosing some information to them; yet, those
lawyers do not report that the quality of representation has been hampered
by their lack of knowledge. 24 Thus, utilitarian arguments in support of an
absolute rule of confidentiality are not compelling.
200; Moore, supra note 12, at 191 n.67 (using social contract theory, one may argue that
patients promise to disclose private information in exchange for a promise of confidentiality).
19. MODEL CODE, supra note 3, at EC 4-1; MODEL RULES, supra note 11, at Rule 1.6
comment; M. FREEDMAN, supra note 12, at 4-5; Abramovsky, supra note 12, at 11-15; Moore,
supra note 12, at 197. See Zacharias, supra note 6, at 356-75. For complete and insightful
discussions of justifications for confidentiality and limits of those justifications, see Landesman,
supra note 12, at 197-201; Subin, supra note 10, at 1159-72. These scholars recognize the
importance of confidentiality but believe an absolute rule is inappropriate.
20. See Zacharias, supra note 6, at 359 n.35.
21. See Subin, supra note 10, at 1163; Zacharias, supra note 6, at 378, 386.
22. See Zacharias, supra note 6, at 378 (earlier study); 380-81 (Zacharias study).
23. Subin, supra note 10, at 1166-67. See Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1142-43 (1988) (clients may disclose information because they are hon-
est, they cannot determine what should be withheld, or they fear liability absent legal advice).
Some clients do not believe assurances of confidentiality and do not confide in lawyers. Subin,
supra note 10, at 1164; see also K. MANN, supra note 8, at 40-52 (clients withhold information
due to embarrassment, mistrust, or view that attorney should not have information); Burt,
Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEO. L.J. 1015, 1020-22 (1981) (listing
reasons why clients mistrust attorneys); Zacharias, supra note 6, at 364 n.58, 367 n.70.
24. K. MANN, supra note 8, at 103-23 (white collar criminal defense lawyers discourage
clients from confiding some information to avoid the requirement of making disclosures and to
19901
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Criticisms may also be raised regarding the deontological support for an
absolute requirement to keep confidences. Although client autonomy is a
"prima facie" right entitled to great respect,25 it may conflict with equal or
more compelling rights.2 6 In such cases, a careful review of the legitimacy
and weight of competing claims must be undertaken to determine the moral
validity of an act. 27 Thus, sophisticated deontological arguments recognize
that, although increasing individual autonomy is good in the abstract,28 it is
not justified in cases where autonomous decisionmaking leads to immoral
acts and results. 29 As a result, deontological reasoning does not support an
unqualified right to confidentiality.
allow lawyers to proclaim client innocence to goverment investigators). See also Zacharias,
supra note 6, at 366-67.
25. Deontological theories were problematic because theorists viewed both formulating a
universalized rule with no exceptions and developing rules which do not conflict with one
another as impossible. W. FRANKENA, supra note 13, at 23. W. D. Ross attempted to deal
with this problem through a theory of "prima-facie" duties. W.D. Ross, supra note 13, at 20.
Ross posits that there may be exceptions to rules regarding "actual duties," which prescribe
what should be done in a particular situation. Id. Prima facie duties, however, are essentially
presumptions that certain duties are morally required to be performed absent some counter-
vailing interest. Id. The author also explains that "prima-facie" terminology is not intended
to connote an illusory or easily ignored right. Id. The prima facie rules are universal and do
not have exceptions; however, they might conflict with other prima facie duties. W.
FRANKENA, supra note 13, at 24. As Ross explains, a "prima-facie duty... [is] a brief way of
referring to the characteristic . . . which an act has . . . of being [one] which would be [an
actual duty] if it were not at the same time [another act] which is morally significant." W.D.
Ross, supra note 13, at 19. For example, keeping a confidence regarding a client's intent to
murder a third party contemplates two acts with moral significance: maintaining client auton-
omy (a fiduciary's prima facie duty), and arguably giving aid to a person causing death (which
violates the prima facie duty of non-maleficence). Both duties are compelling; the question
becomes how to balance those duties. See infra note 29. The notion of prima facie rules can
also be applied to rights. Deontological moral philosophers have generally accepted the notion
that certain duties and rights are prima facie moral demands which can be overridden only in
the most compelling of circumstances. See also T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES
OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 345-47 (1979); R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 13, at 16-17;
R. WRIGHT, supra note 13, at 36-38; Landesman, supra note 12, at 200; Moore, supra note 12,
at 159 n.62, 192 n.68. See also W. FRANKENA, supra note 13, at 35 (moral rights and duties
are correlative). In fact, the example provided above could be phrased in terms of prima facie
rights: The prima facie right of client autonomy conflicts with the prima facie right of the
third party to life.
26. See infra notes 116-34 and accompanying text.
27. See infra note 29.
28. See Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 637, 639.
29. Id. Because an act can be simultaneously both prima facie wrong and right, see supra
note 25, one must determine which performance would result in the greatest balance of right
over wrong. W.D. Ross, supra note 13, at 41. Recognizing that one should consider immoral
results as well as the intrinsic features of an act in judging morality is not an adoption of a
utilitarian theory. Ross explained the difference:
[Vol. 39:441
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Courts and codes of ethics apparently recognize that an absolutist view
regarding confidentiality is wrong and unworkable because they have estab-
lished several exceptions to confidentiality rules. Generally, courts tend to
view the attorney-client privilege as an impediment to truth seeking and to
construe its reach narrowly.3 ° Both the Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility (Model Code) and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Model Rules) include exceptions to the rule of confidentiality.3 ' Commen-
If I have promised to meet a friend at a particular time for some trivial purpose, I
should certainly think myself justified in breaking my engagement if by doing so I
could prevent a serious accident or bring relief to the victims of one. And [utilitari-
ans] hold that my thinking so is due to my thinking that I shall bring more good into
existence by the one action than by the other. A different account may, however, be
given of the matter, an account which will, I believe, show itself to be the true one. It
may be said that besides the duty of fulfilling promises I have and recognize a duty of
relieving distress, and that when I think it right to do the latter at the cost of not doing
the former, it is not because I think I shall produce more good thereby but because I
think it the duty which is in the circumstances more of a duty.
W.D. Ross, supra note 13, at 18 (emphasis added). See also id. at 33 (an act is right only with
reference to its "whole nature"). One can see the distinction by keeping in mind the idea that
the failure of utilitarianism is its inability to recognize a just result in a particular case. See
supra note 14. As Ross explains:
The essential defect of the 'ideal utilitarian' theory is that it ignores, or at least does
not do full justice to, the highly personal character of duty. If the only duty is to
produce the maximum of good, the question who is to have the good - whether it is
myself, or my benefactor, or a person to whom I have made a promise to confer that
good on him, or a mere fellow man to whom I stand in no such special relation -
should make no difference to my having a duty to produce that good. But we are all
in fact sure that it makes a vast difference.
W.D. Ross, supra note 13, at 22. Ross did not attempt to attach priority to any of his prima
facie duties, which are listed at note 13, supra. He did, however, suggest a methodology for
resolving conflicts. One must consider the situation as carefully and fully as possible until he
forms "the considered opinion.., that one duty is more incumbent than any other." Id. at 19;
see also id. at 43 (considered reflection may be fallible but it is the only guide to our duty). See
R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 13, at 16-17; (autonomy is a prima-facie right equal
to beneficence and justice); Moore, supra note 12, at 191-92, 194-95 (the confidentiality pre-
sumption should be stronger as information approaches the private, "core" self). For a discus-
sion of justifications for various exceptions to the confidentiality rule, see infra notes 103-34
and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401-03 (1976). The Supreme Court
held that the attorney-client privilege did not prevent the disclosure of documents in the attor-
ney's possession because those documents were discoverable prior to the transfer, and, there-
fore, not privileged. Id. at 403.
31. Model Rule 1.6(b) provides:
A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary:
(1) To prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes
is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) To establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy be-
tween the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil
claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to
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tators disagree as to the extent of such exceptions, 32 especially regarding the
issues of past fraud and perjury. 3 Perhaps as a result, individual states have
adopted several alternative versions of the confidentiality rule. 4 The gener-
ally recognized exceptions to confidentiality are: client consent, statements
required by law, future crimes, client fraud, claims against attorneys, and
suits for fees.35 These exceptions enjoy varying levels of moral
justification.3 6
Regardless of the propriety of the various exceptions to the confidentiality
rules, such exceptions exist. As a result, some circumstances may dictate
that an attorney share confidential information with others. Yet, the client
may be unaware of the possibility that his secrets will be exposed.
Some clients might find the exceptions material to determining which con-
fidences to share with an attorney. Attorneys may deprive those clients of
information critical to intelligent decisionmaking if they fail to apprise cli-
ents of those exceptions, thereby limiting client's ability to choose rationally
whether to confide in counsel. Such a deprivation does not implicate consti-
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of
the client.
MODEL RULES, supra note 11, at Rule 1.6(b). Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C) provides:
A lawyer may reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected, but
only after a full disclosure to them.
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required
by law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information neccessary
to prevent the crime.
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend
himself ... against an accusation of wrongful conduct.
MODEL CODE, supra note 3, at DR 4-101(C). See also MODEL RULES, supra note 11, at Rule
3.3 (disclosure of fraud to tribunal).
32. Compare M. FREEDMAN, supra note 12, at 27-41; Abramovsky, supra note 12, at 14-
15; Callan & David, supra note 12, at 342-43; with Landesman, supra note 12, at 191; Subin,
supra note 10, at 1114-19; Zacharias, supra note 6, at 359, nn. 33-34.
33. See supra note 32 (articles cited therein).
34. Attorneys Liability Assurance Society Ltd. (ALAS), an insurer for law firms, com-
piled a report comparing confidentiality rules. ATTORNEYS LIABILITY ASSURANCE SOCIETY,
CONFIDENTIALITY/ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 45-51 (1989) [hereinafter ALAS RE-
PORT]. Although its chart format may miss some nuances of confidentiality rules, and some
state laws have changed since ALAS made the report public, it nevertheless provides ample
evidence of the disarray among states regarding the rules. For example, attorneys in 34 states
may report any crime; those in 14 must not; those in 2 (Virginia, Florida) must report. Id. at
46, 51. In the case of a crime involving death or serious bodily harm, 10 states require disclo-
sure; 40 states allow it. No states forbid such disclosure.
35. See supra note 31. There is great controversy regarding the appropriateness of report-
ing past fraud against third parties where lawyers' services were used, see infra note 126, and
regarding disclosure of perjury, see infra note 67.
36. See infra notes 118-34 and accompanying text.
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tutional rights, and the attorney's subsequent disclosure probably does not
create civil liability. Failure to provide an opportunity for informed consent,
however, should be actionable or provide a basis for discipline.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Many clients would not give attorneys incriminating information if they
knew that attorneys might disclose it to the government.37 Thus, some may
argue that an attorney violates a client's fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination 38 or his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of coun-
sel 39 if the attorney discloses statements elicited under an erroneous impres-
sion of confidentiality. Information most likely to raise those problems
would involve plans to commit future crimes or peijury. °
Despite some scholarly commentary to the contrary,41 it is unlikely that a
lawyer's disclosure of future crimes or perjury implicates any constitutional
rights.42 In both fifth and sixth amendment contexts, the United States
Supreme Court has held that asserted rights are protected by the Constitu-
tion only to the extent protected by traditional attorney-client privilege and
other ethical rules.43 Thus, disclosures of perjury or other crimes not pre-
cluded by the privilege do not give rise to any constitutional claims. More-
over, in litigation that may arise as a result of disclosure, a court would
likely focus on the absence of a client's right to commit perjury or other
future crimes, rather than upon his right to be warned about possible disclo-
sure." Therefore, it is doubtful a court would find that defendants have a
constitutional right to be informed of limits to confidentiality.
37. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. V states in relevant part: "No person ... shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
39. U.S. CONST. amend. VI states in relevant part: "[T]he accused shall . . . have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
40. Past crimes may be reportable as future crimes if of a continuing nature. See infra
notes 52, 78-79 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Appel, The Limited Effect of Nix v. Whiteside on Attorney-Client Relations,
136 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1927-28 (1988); Freedman, Client Confidences and Client Perjury:
Some Unanswered Questions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1939, 1946-55 (1988) [hereinafter Freedman,
Client Confidences]; Freedman, Are the Model Rules Unconstitutional?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV.
685, 692-93 (1981).
42. For an excellent discussion of confidentiality and the fifth amendment, see Subin,
supra note 10, at 1120-27.
43. See infra notes 44-49, 57-69 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
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A. The Fifth Amendment Challenge
Fisher v. United States45 is an example of the Supreme Court's disinclina-
tion to extend constitutional protections beyond those contemplated in eth-
ics rules. The Court determined that a lawyer may not assert a client's fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination to prevent seizure of client
records, unless the information sought was protected by the attorney-client
privilege.
In Fisher, the Internal Revenue Service subpoenaed an attorney to pro-
duce his client's tax documents. 46 The Court ordered production of the doc-
uments, finding that the right against self-incrimination applies only to
"personal compulsion against the accused" and does not excuse an attorney
or other agent from the requirement of production. 47  The Court noted,
however, that if the attorney-client privilege protected a particular piece of
testimonial evidence, the attorney would not have to produce it. Otherwise,
clients would know that the government could get information from lawyers
more readily than from the clients themselves and would therefore refrain
from confiding to lawyers. 41 Simply stated, fifth amendment protection ex-
tends to privileged information, but a client cannot create protection for
otherwise unprotected evidence by handing it over to an attorney.49
45. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
46. Id. at 394.
47. Id. at 396 (quoting Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 329 (1973) (emphasis ad-
ded)). The Court held that the accused "is privileged from producing evidence but not from
its production." Id. at 399 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913)). The
Fisher Court rejected an argument that the client has an expectation of privacy in discussions
with an attorney and that he cannot be expected to forfeit his fifth amendment rights in order
to receive legal advice. The Court refused to "cut the Fifth Amendment completely loose from
the moorings of its language" and create a general protection for privacy. Fisher, 425 U.S. at
406. It added that the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment amply protected privacy.
The Supreme Court later applied Fisher to "private" business records in United States v. Doe,
465 U.S. 605 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Clearly then, notwithstanding earlier case law
suggesting a contrary result, see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), the fifth
amendment is now viewed as being limited to protection against incriminating testimonial acts
and not extended to enforcing a general notion of privacy. See Subin, supra note 10, at 1120-
27.
48. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403-04. The Court found that the privilege did not protect the
documents because an accountant prepared them. Hence, the Court concluded that the lawyer
had to produce the documents. Id. at 409.
49. Cf In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967)
(privilege does not encompass an attorney, on his own initiative, taking custody of instrumen-
talities and fruits of crime). Accord People v. Meredith, 29 Cal. 3d 682, 631 P.2d 46, 175 Cal.
Rptr. 612 (1981); State ex rel. Sowers v. Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d 828, 394 P.2d 681 (1964). For a
discussion of Ryder and other cases regarding disclosure of tangible evidence, see Subin, supra
note 10, at 1123-27.
[Vol. 39:441
Limits On Confidentiality
As a result, lawyer disclosures regarding future crimes also do not create a
fifth amendment problem. The attorney-client privilege has never protected
discussions about future crimes.5° Similarly, the Supreme Court has con-
cluded that disclosure of perjury to a tribunal does not implicate the fifth
amendment, stating that the right to avoid incrimination does not include
the affirmative right to lie.51 Moreover, perjury can be viewed as a crime
continuing until the conclusion of trial and thus covered by the future crime
exception to the privilege.52 Consequently, no fifth amendment prohibition
attaches to lawyers who provide incriminating information regarding future
crimes, including perjury, to the government.
53
50. The privilege does not protect such statements because the client seeks to abuse the
attorney-client relationship rather than seek legitimate legal advice. See Clark v. United
States, 289 U.S. 1, 14 (1933) (privilege does not apply where relationship a sham or pretense)
(citing Regina v. Cox, 14 Q.B.D. 153 (1884) (client who commits crime based on an attorney's
advice either deceives or conspires with him)); Subin, supra note 10, at 1114-18 (rationale for
crime-fraud exception is that purposes of attorney-client privilege-assisting client in pursuing
legally acceptable goals or defending rights by legal means-are not at stake).
The privilege similarly leaves future fraud unprotected. Subin, supra note 10, at 1114-18; see
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403. Although most codes allow disclosure of future crimes, only seven
states allow disclosure of future frauds. ALAS REPORT, supra note 34, at 45-51; see supra
notes 10-11 and accompanying text (ethics rules broader than attorney-client privilege).
51. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 173 (1986) (analogizing perjury to crimes of bribing
jurors or threatening witnesses). Whether the sixth amendment is violated by the disclosure of
perjury remains an open question. See infra notes 57-79 and accompanying text. Professor
Freedman argues that perjury should be viewed as different from bribery or threatening a
witness, because those crimes threaten the integrity of the system, while cross-examination will
reveal perjury. Freedman, Client Confidences, supra note 41, at 1950. This distinction, how-
ever, is not compelling. The appropriate question is whether the privilege should be used to
allow abuse of the system or of the attorney-client relationship, not whether it is likely that a
client will be caught. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. Moreover, acceptance of the
distinction presumes defendant is a bad liar and the prosecutor is a good advocate.
52. See, e.g., C. WOLFRAM, supra note 10, at 280-81; Nix, 475 U.S. at 174. See also infra
notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
53. One might argue that, just as police must give a Miranda warning that incriminating
comments can be used against a defendant, so must an attorney warn a client they can be so
used. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 346 (1966). The Supreme Court would probably not
accept such an extension of Miranda, because the Court based a requirement of Miranda
warnings upon the notion that custodial interrogations conducted by law enforcement agents
are inherently coercive. Id. at 456-58; see Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?.
A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1838 (1987). Thus, Miranda
mandates that law enforcement officials provide warnings to subjects in custody prior to inter-
rogation.
Law office interviews between lawyer and client fail to meet any of the Miranda criteria.
First, lawyers are not law enforcement officials. The emphasis in Miranda on law enforcement
officials and the general requirement of state action combine to indicate that Miranda does not
apply to interrogations by private citizens. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 6.10, 540-41 (1984). Although some courts have applied Miranda to interrogations by pri-
vate persons who are agents of the police, LaFave and Israel state that:
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B. The Sixth Amendment Challenges
Given the Supreme Court's reluctance to extend constitutional protections
beyond those articulated in ethics codes, it is similarly unlikely that it would
unless a person realizes he is dealing with the police, their efforts to elicit incriminat-
ing statements from him do not constitute "police interrogation" within the meaning
of Miranda. It is the impact on the suspect's mind of the interplay between police
interrogation and police custody-each condition reinforcing the pressures and anxi-
eties produced by the other-which creates "custodial interrogation" within the
meaning of Miranda.
Id. at 542 (citing Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda: What Is "Interroga-
tion"? When Does it Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1, 50-53, 63-69 (1978). Some argue that the lawyer.
acts as a state official if ordered by the court to disclose information. See Estelle v. Smith, 451
U.S. 454 (1981) (Miranda applies to interrogation by court appointed psychiatrist); Mathis v.
United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968) (Miranda applies to interrogation by civil IRS investigator);
cf Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984) (Miranda requirements might apply to interro-
gations by parole officer if defendant in custody). However, it seems unlikely that the Supreme
Court would view an attorney-client meeting as creating the same potential for coercion as an
interrogation by a known government agent, which clearly supplied the basis for imposition of
Miranda requirements in Mathis and Estelle. 391 U.S. at 4; 451 U.S. at 469. Cf People v.
Younghanz, 156 Cal. App. 3d 811, 202 Cal. Rptr. 907 (1984) (psychologist required by statute
to report child abuse held not a state agent because the statute required only that the psycholo-
gist make an initial report and did not require assumption of investigative duties). Next, inter-
rogation occurs only with "express questioning or its functional equivalent;" Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). The threshold test for interrogation would require a show-
ing that the attorney should have known that a general promise of confidentiality or failure to
warn of its limits was "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Id. at 302. See
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra, § 6.7 at 503, 513. Although a few instances exist where a
lawyer might be aware of such a probability, such as the long-term representation of habitual
criminals, one generally should not assume clients will disclose future crimes or perjury. Fi-
nally, the attorney clearly does not hold the client in custody. Again, one could argue that the
legal counselling context presents an equally coercive situation, because the lawyer emphasizes
the essential nature of full disclosure to assure competent representation. Cf Fleming & Max-
imov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1025, 1059
(1974) (interviews with psychologists coercive); see supra note 8 and accompanying text
(promises of confidentiality and statements that candor is critical to competent representation
are "facilitators" of client disclosure). However, the Supreme Court has required Miranda
warnings only in the situation where a suspect has been formally arrested or the suspect's
freedom of action has been circumscribed in a significant way. The Court has consistently
rejected arguments that police must warn whenever a reasonable person might feel coerced.
See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (defendant not in custody because he came
voluntarily to police station in response to a written request and he was not told he must
remain); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (IRS interview at defendant's house
not custodial). If the Supreme Court would accept the notion that the lawyer was working for
the state, which is unlikely, an interesting question would be presented regarding attorney-
client interviews while the client is in custody. See Mathis, 391 U.S. at 4-5 (Miranda require-
ments apply regardless of whether police hold a defendant in custody for purposes unrelated to
interrogation).
Thus, attorney-client conferences meet none of the Miranda requirements, and the Supreme
Court is disinclined to extend Miranda. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424-25 (1985)
(declining invitation to extend Miranda to forbid police deception of attorney, finding that
such activity has no relevance to compulsion experienced by defendant in custody). See Ogle-
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find that disclosures of client information implicate a sixth amendment inef-
fective assistance of counsel issue. In Strickland v. Washington,54 the
Supreme Court articulated a two part test for determining whether ineffec-
tive assistance occurred. Assistance of counsel is ineffective if an attorney's
conduct did not fall within the range of reasonable professional assistance,
and the faulty representation had a prejudicial impact upon the trial." A
defendant may raise three alternative arguments to claim ineffective assist-
ance of counsel in the context of disclosure of future crimes or perjury.
First, the disclosure itself may render assistance ineffective. Next, a pre-
sumption of ineffective assistance may arise because the potential of disclo-
sure creates an untenable conflict between attorney and client. Finally, a
failure to apprise the client of the possibility of disclosure can abridge the
right to effective assistance of counsel.56
tree, supra, at 1839-42 (outlines cases where Miranda narrowly applied). Although state
courts may adopt broader Miranda protections, see Note, Miranda and the State Constitution:
State Courts Take a Stand, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1693 (1986), it is unlikely they would adopt
rules inconsistent with their own ethics code requirements. See infra notes 110-11 and accom-
panying text. The California Supreme Court considered a similar issue in Younghanz. There, a
defendant told a counselor he had sexually abused his daughter. 156 Cal. App. 3d at 814, 202
Cal. Rptr. at 909. The court rejected the defendant's argument that Miranda applied, stating
that a public policy to treat the child, rather than the enforcement of the law, represented the
overriding purpose of the statute. Id. at 816-17, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
An argument that a confession to an attorney was not informed and therefore involuntary
would also be rejected. Confessions are involuntary only if coerced. See Colorado v. Connelly,
479 U.S. 157 (1986) (confession by defendant found to be voluntary although he suffered from
psychosis that interfered with his right to make free and rational choices). Even assuming
some violation of Miranda were found, all that would be required to protect the defendant is
that the attorney's testimony be excluded in a future trial. Subin, supra note 10, at 1120-21
(use of exclusionary rule would resolve constitutional issues).
54. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
55. Id. at 689, 694; see Appel, supra note 41, at 1925.
56. It may also be argued that assistance of counsel is denied because the state interferes
with the attorney-client relationship if it elicits the attorney's aid in procuring information.
The Supreme Court in several cases has found that, once the right to counsel arises, a state
may not lull a defendant into complacency and subsequent disclosure by using one who is
seemingly a friend to elicit evidence. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (improper
for codefendant to elicit information because defendant thereby unaware that government
agent is interrogator). Cases following Massiah include United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264,
274 (1980) (improper to use cellmate as informant because defendant likely to talk to person
sharing a "common plight"); and Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 n. 13 (1985) (improper
for codefendant to elicit statements which defendant "would not intentionally reveal - and
had a constitutional right not to reveal - to a person known to be a police agent.").
Using Massiah and its progeny in the attorney-client context has a strong appeal because the
lawyer is a fiduciary who is even more likely to elicit trust than a codefendant or cellmate
might be. See Freedman, Client Confidences, supra note 41, at 1943-48. It thus seems particu-
larly unseemly that an attorney would function in the dual capacities of counsel and inform-
ant. However, there can be no sixth amendment right to counsel regarding future crimes or
regarding perjury, even if it has already occurred, because no indictment or its equivalent has
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yet been issued for those crimes. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (right to counsel arises
when judicial proceedings commence); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967) (sixth
amendment implicated at " 'critical' stages in the judicial process 'where the results might well
settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.' " See W. LAFAVE & J.
ISRAEL, supra note 53, § 6.4. Moreover, a defendant may not raise a sixth amendment chal-
lenge to information regarding unindicted crimes by claiming that information was elicited in
connection with an investigation of crimes regarding which the sixth amendment right had
attached. See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 180 (information elicited regarding pending prosecution
was protected by sixth amendment, but information concerning future related crime of mur-
dering a witness was not; to hold otherwise would unnecessarily frustrate public interest in
investigation of criminal activities.
One issue remains open after Moulton regarding crimes other than those presently being
prosecuted. The Court stated that "incriminating statements pertaining to pending charges
are inadmissible." Id. Statements about future crimes generally would not be relevant to the
original trial, so no Massiah problem exists regarding those statements. Statements indicating
that a defendant plans to perjure himself at the original trial are arguably ones "pertaining" to
the original crime. Moulton could be read to require that such statements are inadmissible at
the original trial though they may be admitted at a later trial for perjury. Because the trial
court admitted statements about the original crime in Moulton, the court did not reach the
question of whether admitting only statements about a fabricated defense would violate the
sixth amendment.
A distinction can be drawn, however, between Massiah and disclosures regarding future
crime or perjury so that one could use those statements at the original trial without violating
sixth amendment rights. An attorney can lawfully help a client by advising him not to incrimi-
nate himself regarding past crimes. Thus, as Massiah indicates, a third party should not be
able to elicit that information. Conversely, the lawyer may not assist in future crime or per-
jury, so informants do not interfere with any legitimate aim of the attorney-client relationship.
Moreover, the Supreme Court consistently has made clear that Massiah rests upon the no-
tion that one may not circumvent "the accused's right to have counsel present in a confronta-
tion between the accused and a state agent." Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176 (emphasis added).
That is, Massiah recognizes a right of the accused to rely on the fact that the state will deal
with him only through his attorney. When the defendant has an attorney present, the state
deals with the client through the attorney, and the state does not deny the right to counsel.
Thus, attorney disclosures do not implicate Massiah rights.
Analogous to Massiah are cases finding a constitutional violation where attorney-client con-
versations are unknowingly intercepted. See, e.g., O'Brien v. United States, 386 U.S. 345
(1967); Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966). See also Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S.
545 (1976) (codefendant/informant does not violate sixth amendment right to counsel by at-
tending conference with defendant and his attorney so long as conversations overheard do not
directly or indirectly produce evidence offered at trial by the prosecutor). Attorney disclosures
of future crimes or perjury do not violate the principle of those cases. Bursey seems to indicate
that disclosures by an informant who has infiltrated the defense camp are permissible so long
as those disclosures are not protected by the attorney-client privilege. See id. at 554-55, n.4,
(citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (sixth amendment violated if informant
gives privileged information)); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 402-05 (1976) (only those
communications covered by the purpose of the privilege protected)). The attorney-client privi-
lege does not apply to future crimes or perjury, see supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text;
see also infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. Moreover, the danger of an informant in the
defense camp is the same as that contemplated in Massiah and its progeny: the intrusion,
without the attorney's knowledge, into the attorney-client relationship. If the attorney is una-
ware of government involvement, she is unable to assist at all. Cf Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S.
454, 462 (1981) (sixth amendment violated where client unable to confer with attorney before
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1. Disclosure as Ineffective Assistance
The Supreme Court considered ineffective assistance of counsel and attor-
ney disclosures in Nix v. Whiteside,57 and once again articulated that the
Constitution is not violated if ethics rules are followed. In Nix, counsel for
defendant Whiteside successfully dissuaded the defendant from offering per-
jurious testimony.58 The Court referred to various codes of legal ethics to
resolve the issue of whether the attorney acted within the parameters of rea-
sonableness. 9 The Court stated that "virtually all sources speak with the
same voice"'  and require disclosure of perjury.6' In addition, the Court
noted that those "sources" exempt future crimes from the protection of the
attorney-client privilege.62 Thus, one may use the Nix analysis to conclude
that the sixth amendment does not preclude disclosure of perjury or future
crimes because disclosure in either instance comports with ethics codes and
represents reasonable attorney conduct.63
Justice Blackmun concurred in Nix specifically to indicate that the major-
ity's discussion of perjury revelation was mere dicta.' Moreover, the major-
ity opinion included some inaccurate statements. The lawyer in Nix kept the
submitting to psychiatric examination). Conversely, if the attorney feels compelled to disclose,
she is aware of the fact the government will receive information. She may be disloyal and
provide ineffective assistance because she compromises the interests of the client, but assistance
is not absent. For a discussion of ineffective assistance of counsel, see infra notes 57-93 and
accompanying text.
57. 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
58. In Nix, the Supreme Court gave a state court finding regarding the falsity of the pro-
posed testimony a presumption of correctness as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988). Id.
at 180 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Commentators following Nix have discussed at length the
requirement that the attorney "know" the client intends to lie. Freedman, Client Confidences,
supra note 41, at 1940-46; Kimball, When Does a Lawyer "Know" Her Client Will Commit
Perjury 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 579 (1988). Scholars recognized problems with finding
knowledge of impending client perjury prior to Nix. See, e.g., M. FREEDMAN, supra note 12,
at 51-58; Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 809, 842-43 (1977).
59. Nix, 457 U.S. at 166-71.
60. Id. at 166.
61. Id. at 168.
62. Id.
63. In United States v. Henkel, 799 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1986), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered whether a lawyer's attempt to withdraw because he
could not "professionally proceed" violated the sixth amendment. Id. at 370. Although the
trial judge clearly understood that defendant intended to lie, and commended counsel for not
aiding the client, the Seventh Circuit held that no violation had occurred. In so doing, the
court cited Nix for the proposition that an attorney may make "an explicit statement to the
court of the fact that perjury is about to be committed." Id. But see Lowery v. Cardwell, 575
F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1978) (due process violated where counsel effectively notifies factfinder
of perjury).
64. Nix, 475 U.S. at 189 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that majority implicitly en-
dorses state codes of ethics).
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defendant from testifying falsely. Consequently, it never became necessary
to divulge any client communications.65 Although the sources do "speak
with one voice" that the attorney must attempt to talk the client out of ly-
ing,6 6 great controversy exists regarding whether to disclose the lie if the
attorney does not prevail in her attempt to dissuade. 67 At least where au-
thorities conflict, the Court should hesitate to attach constitutional signifi-
cance to the various codes of ethics. 6' Given the Court's deference to ethics
65. Id. at 172. Nix also left open the question whether the Constitution permits an attor-
ney to preclude the defendant from testifying in those situations where all his testimony would
be perjurious. The circuits split on this issue prior to Nix. Compare United States ex. rel
Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977) (violation) with United States v. Curtis, 742
F.2d 1070 (7th Cir. 1984) (not a violation). Justice Blackmun noted that the parties did not
present the issue in Nix. 475 U.S. at 186 n.5 (Blackmun, J. concurring.) Since the Nix deci-
sion, one court has indicated that the sixth amendment is violated where defendant is com-
pletely precluded from testifying. United States v. Butts, 630 F. Supp. 1145 (D. Me. 1986).
For a discussion of whether defendants have the "right to lie," see infra notes 75-79 and ac-
companying text.
66. See, e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 3, at DR 7-102(B)(1); MODEL RULES, supra note
11, at Rule 3.3; see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 4-7.7 (1986)
(Standard for the Defense Function); ABA Formal Op. 287 (1953); ABA Formal Op. 87-353
(1987). Professor Freedman, perhaps the most ardent critic of the requirement to disclose
perjury, advocates that the lawyer should attempt to dissuade the client. See M. FREEDMAN,
supra note 12, at 31.
67. Compare MODEL CODE, supra note 3, at DR 7-102(B)(1); ABA Formal Op. 314
(1965); ABA Formal Op. 287'(1953) (attorney may not disclose fraud upon the tribunal when
information is a confidence or secret) with MODEL RULES, supra note 11, at Rule 3.3; ABA
Formal Opinion 87-353 (1987) (stating that ABA position has changed and attorney must
disclose). State supreme courts have the ultimate responsibility (absent a constitutional imped-
iment) to determine what ethics rules must guide members of their bar. See STANDARDS FOR
LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS Rule 2.1; Nix, 475 U.S. at 177 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring); Id. at 189-90 (Blackmun, J., concurring). States have varying views re-
garding whether it is appropriate to disclose perjury. See ALAS REPORT, supra note 34 (35
states require disclosure; 15 prohibit it). See also infra note 126 and accompanying text.
68. As Justice Burger observed in Nix:
In some future case challenging attorney conduct in the case of a state-court trial, we
may need to define with greater precision the weight to be given to recognized canons
of ethics, the standards established by the state in statutes or professional codes, and
the Sixth Amendment, in defining the proper scope and limits on that conduct.
Nix, 475 U.S. at 165-66. Cf Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978) (due process
violated where counsel effectively notifies factfinder of perjury). State bar rules regarding ad-
vertising, solicitation, and limitations on practice enjoy a comparative lack of deference to
those rules regarding disclosures of crimes or frauds. See, e.g., Supreme Court of Va. v. Fried-
man, 487 U.S. 59, 67 (1988) (state bar residency requirement violates privileges and immuni-
ties clause); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988) (direct mail solicitation
prohibitions violate first amendment); In re RMJ, 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (many advertising limi-
tations violate first amendment). Of course, some may see the object of those rules as the
protection of lawyers rather than of clients or the system.
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rules in both fifth and sixth amendment contexts, 69 however, the rules will
likely continue to provide the outside limits to constitutional protection.
The question whether the attorney has provided ineffective assistance of
counsel if she discloses client perjury or future crimes arguably remains open
after Nix. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court probably would not conclude
assistance is ineffective in such cases. Although the Model Rules do not
allow disclosure of future crimes unless they involve death or substantial
bodily harm,7° disclosures of future crimes have long been recognized as an
exception to the attorney-client privilege.71 Therefore, the Court would
most likely find such disclosures reasonable. Also, disclosure of future
crimes has no prejudicial impact on the trial of the original charge.72
The question of ineffective assistance due to disclosure of perjury is not
quite as straightforward, given the greater likelihood of prejudice on a pend-
ing charge, but the result would probably be the same. The majority in Nix
stated that the range of reasonable attorney responses to perjury encom-
passes disclosure. 73 The concurring opinion, which did not reach this ques-
tion, nonetheless presented the view that a defendant suffers no cognizable
prejudice from disclosure. Justice Blackmun noted that "the touchstone of a
claim of prejudice is an allegation that counsel's behavior did something to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." 74 He
added that avoiding conviction by perjury is fundamentally unfair, and that
the right to testify does not include the right to lie.7 5 Moreover, Justice
Blackmun reasoned, to the extent a defendant's claim rests upon the notion a
jury would have acquitted him if he had lied successfully, "a defendant has
no entitlement to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker.
' 76
69. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
72. There may be prejudicial impact if the future crime relates to the charge, however,
such as where the client confides that he intends to kill a witness or bribe a juror and the court
admits that statement into evidence. However, the client's act rather than the attorney's dis-
closure is the cause of prejudice. See infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
73. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 170 (1986).
74. Id. at 184 (Blackmun, J. concurring) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984)).
75. Id. at 186 (quoting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971)).
76. Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.) It may be an overstatement to say that the
client has no right to lie. Nothing requires a court to screen a defendant's testimony to deter-
mine, prior to the testimony, whether defendant will lie on the stand, and enacting such a
requirement may be unconstitutional. Cf Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (per se rule
excluding all hypnotically induced testimony infringes defendant's right to testify in her own
behalf despite argument such testimony is unreliable); Nix, 475 U.S. at 184 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (Supreme Court has assumed that defendant has right to testify in his own be-
half). Thus, defendant may have the right to present his testimony; then the cross-examiner
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Thus, the Supreme Court would not find prejudice because of a disclosure
of perjury, especially in light of Justice Blackmun's comment that the de-
fendant had "identified no right to insist that [his lawyer] keep confidential a
plan to commit perjury.",77 Moreover, if the Court follows the view articu-
lated in the Model Rules that perjury is a crime continuing until the end of
legal proceedings, 78 perjury will be viewed as within the future crime excep-
tion to confidentiality and accordingly would be unprotected.79
2. Presumption of Untenable Conflict as Ineffective Assistance
The Nix court rejected a second and related argument that a court should
presume prejudice because an untenable conflict arose between attorney and
client regarding client perjury.8" Both the majority and concurring opinions
in Nix concluded that, while a client is entitled to undivided loyalty, such
loyalty does not extend to aiding perjury.8 ' Instead, a court may reverse
must prove it false. Professor Freedman posits that, although defendants do not have the
"right" to lie, the consequence of such a lie should not be waiver of fifth amendment rights, but
instead should be the normal consequences of rigorous cross-examination, longer sentences, or
perjury prosecution. Freedman, Client Confidences, supra note 41, at 1951-52. In support,
Freedman relies upon New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979). In Portash, the prosecutor
gave defendant use immunity for testimony before a grand jury. Id. at 451. The Supreme
Court held that the prosecutor could not use the grand jury evidence to impeach a perjurious
statement at the later trial because the grand jury testimony was the "essence of compelled
testimony." Id. at 459.
However, any coercion in the attorney-client context does not arise to a constitutional level;
see supra note 53. Moreover, a defendant clearly does not have the right to counsel's aid in
that endeavor. Cf supra note 56 (attorney may lawfully advise the client not to incriminate
himself regarding past crimes but may not assist in perjury or future crime). However, an
interesting question is raised when an attorney dissuades a client from committing perjury by
telling the client that she will inform the court, and the client thereafter refrains from offering
both perjurious testimony and truthful testimony he fears the attorney will not believe. To
avoid this situation, attorneys should tell clients they have a duty to disclose only if they know
the client is lying. See infra note 58. Of course, the danger lies with the intelligent client, who
may refrain from sharing any information with the lawyer so that he may lie and the lawyer
will not report it. See infra note 188-98 and accompanying text.
77. Nix, 475 U.S. at 187 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Freedman reaches the opposite con-
clusion: he believes that the Supreme Court will conclude that the attorney may not disclose
perjury after the fact. Freedman, Client Confidences, supra note 41, at 1955.
78. Model Rule 3.3 states that the duty to disclose perjury to a tribunal continues until the
conclusion of the proceeding, supporting the notion that the fraud on the court is continuing.
MODEL RULES, supra note 11, Rule 3.3(b). Cf In re A, 276 Or. 225, 554 P.2d 479 (1976)
(court continues to rely upon misleading testimony throughout trial).
79. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
80. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980) (court will not presume prejudice
from mere existence of conflict of interest); Appel, supra note 41, at 1926. This is the crux of
the argument made in the Massiah/Bursey context: The state has encroached upon the attor-
ney-client relationship by requiring disclosure, thereby creating a conflict between loyalty to
the client and loyalty to the judicial system. See supra note 56.
81. Nix, 475 U.S. at 176, 187.
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convictions only if a conflict of interest infringed upon a defendant's "legiti-
mate interests in vigorous protection of his constitutional rights.",8 2 Just as
both the majority and concurrence in Nix concluded that a defendant had no
right to testify falsely, the Court unsurprisingly did not find a violation due
only to a strain on the attorney-client relationship that resulted from a client
attempting to lie.83 The same rationale would apply to other future crimes.
Moreover, the Court has continually stated that the sixth amendment does
not entitle the client to any particular counsel of choice.8 4 The lawyer may
simply withdraw as counsel when a conflict arises.85
3. Failure to Inform the Client About Disclosure as Ineffective
Assistance
If the Supreme Court intends to use ethics rules as the guide to determin-
ing whether counsel has rendered ineffective assistance, one could argue
that, by failing to advise the client about limits on confidentiality, the attor-
ney has violated the rules by breaching her duty to provide the client with
information necessary to make an informed decision. 6 As ethics codes
unanimously require the attorney to provide information material to client
choice,87 perhaps the attorney who does not inform the client about limits
82. Id. at 187 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
83. Justice Blackmun also found no actual prejudice to defendant Whiteside because he
most likely benefitted his case by refraining from presenting perjured testimony. Id. at 187-88.
As Justice Blackmun observed, a lie could have presented the basis for a perjury conviction,
and the jury might have assumed Whiteside also lied about other issues if the court caught him
lying on one issue through cross-examination. Id. One cannot be as sanguine about the benefi-
cial impact of a lawyer reporting a client's past, undiscovered perjury. It clearly would be
harmful. In response, the Court would probably state that the client has no right to rely on the
hope that the jury would accept his perjurious testimony and acquit him. See supra notes 74-
76 and accompanying text.
84. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988) (affirming judicial ruling that over-
rode client consent and disqualified attorney when a conflict of interest existed, but holding
refusal of counsel of choice did not violate the sixth amendment); cf Caplin & Drysdale v.
United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989) (forfeiture provisions of criminal law that may result in
client being unable to have and pay counsel of choice does not violate sixth amendment). For
a discussion of Caplin & Drysdale, see Note, Caplin & Drysdale v. United States and United
States v. Monsanto: Forfeiture of Attorney Fees and Constitutional Rights, 39 CATH. U.L.
REV. 269 (1989).
85. Subin, supra note 10, at 1130-32 (sixth amendment not violated by destruction of
attorney-client relationship if client has opportunity to retain another attorney).
86. MODEL RULES, supra note 11, at Rule 1.4. For a discussion of the scope of the in-
formed consent requirement, see infra notes 135-84 and accompanying text.
87. The Model Rules explicitly require that information be shared; earlier codes included
the requirement but stated it with less clarity. MODEL RULES, supra note 11, at Rule 1.4. See
also MODEL CODE, supra note 3, at EC 7-7; 7-8.
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on confidentiality does not act within the range of reasonable behavior and
renders ineffective assistance.1
8
There are several responses to this argument. First, the Supreme Court
has been reluctant to create a requirement of a "meaningful relationship"
with one's lawyer.8 9 Thus, the Court may draw the line at an attempt to
constitutionalize informed consent and may determine that breach of an eth-
ics rule does not automatically result in ineffective assistance of counsel.90
Moreover, the initial failure to inform does not cause prejudice. Before
disclosing future crimes or perjury, a lawyer has the responsibility to attempt
to dissuade the client from such a course of conduct. 9' Part of that discus-
sion should include a statement that the lawyer has a responsibility to make
appropriate disclosures if the client persists. At that point, the client may
choose to act or to refrain from acting as originally planned. Thus, the act of
the client, rather than the initial failure to inform, is the cause of any ensuing
prejudice. A defendant could argue that if he had been informed of his law-
yer's responsibility to disclose perjury he would not have told the lawyer of
his plans and would have proceeded with the unlawful act without the law-
yer's knowledge. However, an argument that prejudice results from his in-
ability to act in that manner looks remarkably like the argument rejected in
Nix that a client has the right to hope he can fool a jury through illegal
means.
92
The discussion in this section may be reduced to a single point. Future
crimes and perjury are viewed as beyond the scope of the attorney-client
privilege.93 It is highly unlikely that the present Supreme Court will extend
fifth or sixth amendment protections to keep such confidences inviolate, or
to require an attorney to warn her client about limitations on the privilege.
Therefore, no basis exists for a constitutional challenge to a resulting crimi-
nal conviction based on such disclosures. The next section, then, focuses on
88. Informed consent requires an attorney to disclose all material information to the cli-
ent. See infra notes 135-38, 147-55 and accompanying text. At least some clients would like to
know about the potential for attorney disclosures but are never so informed. Cf. Maness v.
Myers, 419 U.S. 449 (1974) (assertion of testimonial privilege depends on legal advice as it is
not self executing; laypersons may not be aware of the scope, nuances and boundaries of the
privilege).
89. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983). In fact, the sixth amendment does not re-
quire assistance of any particular lawyer. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
90. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 (1986).
91. See MODEL CODE, supra note 3, at DR 7-102(B)(1); MODEL RULES, supra note 11, at
Rule 3.3 comment (1983); ABA Formal Op. 87-353 (1987) (Standing Comm. on Ethics and
Prof. Resp.) (Lawyer's Responsibility with Relation to Client Perjury).
92. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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whether any civil liability arises from disclosure or failure to inform about
the possibility of disclosures.
III. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR BREACHING CONFIDENCES
Because keeping confidences remains an integral part of the attorney-cli-
ent relationship, a state disciplinary board may discipline an attorney for
violating the ethical responsibility to remain silent.94 Moreover, clients can
maintain various civil causes of action for disclosure of those confidences. 95
For example, clients could allege a breach of an express or implied promise
to maintain confidentiality.96 Alternatively, they could sue for breach of
statutory duty, using ethics codes or an attorney-client privilege statute in
support.97 Clients could also maintain claims of invasion of privacy9 and
malpractice.99
Perhaps the most appropriate cause of action involving an improperly
shared confidence is for breach of fiduciary duty. l°° Such a claim focuses on
94. See, e.g., Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Meredith, 752 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1988); In re Pool,
401 Mass. 460, 517 N.E.2d 444 (1988); In re Nelson, 327 N.W.2d 576 (Minn. 1983); Matter of
Wyse, 688 P.2d 758 (Mont. 1984), modified 697 P.2d 94 (1985); Bar Ass'n of Greater Cleve-
land v. Watkins, 68 Ohio St. 2d 11, 427 N.E.2d 516 (1981).
95. See R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, § 11.5, at 664 (3d ed. 1989); see
generally Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426 (1982)
[hereinafter Note, Breach of Confidence]; Note, To Tell or Not to Tell: Physician's Liability for
Disclosure of Confidential Information About a Patient, 13 CUMB. L. REV. 617 (1983) [herein-
after Note, To Tell Or Not To Tell]; Note, The Illinois Parental Notice Abortion Act: Legal and
Ethical Ramifications of a Physician's Decision to Give Parental Notification, 18 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 475 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Parental Notice]; Note, Duty to Warn Versus Duty to
Maintain Confidentiality. Conflicting Demands on Mental Health Professionals, 20 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 579 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Duty to Warn]. Most breach of confidence cases
involve physicians and banks. Note, Breach of Confidence, supra, at 1428.
96. See, e.g., Goldberg v. American Home Assurance Co., 80 A.D.2d 409, 439 N.Y.S.2d 2
(1981); Citizens State Bank v. Shapiro, 575 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); see generally
Note, Parental Notice, supra note 95, at 485. Claims of breach of contract are subject to con-
tractual limitations such as inability to collect punitive damages or damages for emotional
distress. Note, Breach of Confidence, supra note 95, at 1446.
97. See, e.g., Goldberg, 80 A.D.2d at 409, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 2; see generally Note, Breach of
Confidence, supra note 95, at 1447; Note, To Tell or Not to Tell, supra note 95, at 631-34.
98. Patients have sued physicians for breach of privacy in this context. See, e.g., Horne v.
Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973) (citing Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty, 243 F.
Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965)); Doe v. Roe, 93 A.D.2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1977);
see generally Note, Breach of Confidence, supra note 95, at 428-30; Note, To Tell or Not to Tell,
supra note 95, at 630-61; Note, Parental Notice, supra note 95, at 487-90.
99. See R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, supra note 95, § 11.5, at 644.
100. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Kallimopoulou, 56 Misc. 2d 828, 290 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1967);
Lott v. Ayres, 611 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); see also Note, Breach of Confidence,
supra note 95, at 1448-49, 1459-60; Note, Parental Notice, supra note 95, at 485, 493.
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the nature of the attorney-client relationship and recognizes the duty of the
attorney to refrain from abusing the trust the client placed in her."'
A breach of confidence for personal gain or where no competing consider-
ations exist represents an egregious abuse of the attorney-client relationship
and is actionable.' 0 2 However, an attorney may be justified in making dis-
closures to protect herself or third parties from harm.
Courts have fashioned affirmative defenses to breach of confidence suits
that are consistent with the exceptions listed in professional legal ethics
codes. For example, in those states that require disclosure of future crimes
or perjury, the attorney would have an absolute privilege because the law
compels her to speak.'° 3
101. See supra notes 9-20 and accompanying text. A suit for lack of informed consent is
based upon a notion of breach of fiduciary duty. See infra notes 135-98. One author advocates
the designation of a new tort - breach of confidence. Note, Breach of Confidence, supra note
95, at 1426. The author notes that maintenance of such a claim protects two interests. First,
fostering the security of a confidential relationship presents a general societal interest, because
it assures communication. Id. at 1434. Second, a more specific interest lies in avoiding the
injuries which foreseeably flow from disclosure. Id. The author recognizes that more tradi-
tional theories can be used to support a finding of liability but suggests that such recognition
requires an overt consideration of the fact that the relationship has been compromised. Id. at
1437-48.
A tort action for breach of confidence may be necessary in order to assure that
nonfiduciaries will maintain confidences. Id. at 1459. It is unnecessary in the context of attor-
ney disclosures, because a party would have to predicate a claim for breach of fiduciary duty
upon an abuse of the relationship, and that claim protects the same interests the author seeks
to protect through a breach of confidence claim. See, e.g., In re Nelson, 327 N.W.2d 576
(Minn. 1983) (discipline for bad faith, unauthorized disclosure).
102. Cf. Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 333 F. Supp. 1049 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (disclo-
sures may be basis for discipline or civil liability), aff'd, 469 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973); In re Pool, No. 83-87 (Mass. Supp. (Jan. 18, 1984)) (attorney
disbarred for divulging confidence to get access to client funds) (reinstated 401 Mass. 460, 517
N.E.2d 444 (1988)).
103. A lawyer would have the same defense available if a court orders her to speak. See
MODEL CODE, supra note 3, at DR 4-104(C)(2); MODEL RULES, supra note I1, at Rule 1.6(a).
Cf Hope v. Landau, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 240, 486 N.E.2d 89 (1985) (summary judgment in
favor of psychologist who reported child abuse as required by statute). Note, Breach of Confi-
dence, supra note 95, at 1462; Note, Parental Notice, supra note 95, at 499-500. No cases have
arisen in which a client sued for breach of confidence when the lawyer had a legal compulsion
to disclose. See Note, Attorney-Client Privilege - Contempt: The Dilemma in Nondisclosure
of Possibly Privileged Information Dike v. Dike, 75 Wash. Dec. 2d 1, 448 P.2d 490 (1968), 45
WASH. L. REV. 181, 185 (1970) (no appellate cases reported of client recovery for attorney
disclosures pursuant to court order). However, at least one court has contemplated such a
defense. See In re Gillham, 704 P.2d 1019 (Mont. 1985). In Gillham, the client petitioned for
post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 1019. The Attorney
General ordered the attorney to submit "an affidavit relating to the allegations." Id. at 1020.
The attorney refused, stating he feared breaching confidences. Id. The court ordered the at-
torney to be named as respondent and to submit a response. In affirming the order, the
Supreme Court of Montana found that the client had opened the door to consideration of
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In many more cases, however, the ethics rules merely allow the attorney
to exercise her discretion and to disclose information when she thinks a par-
ticular situation requires disclosure." Thus, an attorney will receive pro-
tection only where she can show that, on balance, her interests or those of
third parties outweigh the client's right to confidentiality.
10 5
Moreover, it is well established that professionals may disclose confi-
dences to avoid danger to a third party or to the public health.'" 6 In fact,
professionals may be liable to third parties if they do not disclose and any
harm results. 10 7 Crimes not involving a substantial likelihood of physical
confidential information by alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. The court made clear
that the attorney would not be subject to discipline or a claim of malpractice as a result of any
required disclosures. Id.
104. See supra note 31.
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 comment f (1958); see Note, Parental
Notice, supra note 95, at 496-97.
106. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 440-42, 551 P.2d 334,
346-48, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 26-28 (1976) (confidential relation outweighed by potential harm to
third party); Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 228-29, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (1920) (physician
may disclose to hotel owner that guest has contagious disease); Bryson v. Tillinghast, 749 P.2d
110, 113-14 (Okla. 1988) (doctor may disclose fact that patient was treated for injury similar to
that of rape suspect to protect public welfare); Peck v. Counseling Serv., 146 Vt. 61, 67-68, 499
A.2d 422, 426-27 (1985) (mental patient's threat of serious harm to an identified victim
presented the appropriate circumstances under which the physician-patient privilege may be
waived); see also Note, Breach of Confidence, supra note 95, at 1464; Note, Parental Notice,
supra note 95, at 496.
107. See, e.g., Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 193 (D. Neb. 1980) (psy-
chotherapist's affirmative duty to initiate reasonably necessary precautions to protect potential
victims of patient); Hedlund v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 695, 705-06, 669 P.2d 41, 46-47, 194
Cal. Rptr. 805, 810-11 (1983) (psychotherapist's duty to warn extended to minor son of wo-
man injured by psychotherapist's patient); Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 436-37, 441, 551 P.2d at 343-
44, 347, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 20 (psychotherapist obligated to take whatever steps reasonably
necesary under the circumstances to prevent harm to third party); McIntosh v. Milano, 168
N.J. Super. 466, 489-90, 403 A.2d 500, 511-12 (1979) (psychiatrist's duty to take reasonable
steps to protect intended or potential victim of patient); Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp. &
Health Center, 39 Ohio St. 3d 86, 99, 529 N.E.2d 449, 460 (1988) (psychiatrist may be held
liable for the violent acts of a voluntarily hospitalized mental patient subsequent to the pa-
tient's discharge); Peck, 146 Vt. at 66-67, 499 A.2d at 425-26 (mental health professional has a
duty to take reasonable steps to protect third persons from threatened physical harm posed to
them by his or her patient); cf Cole v. Taylor, 301 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Iowa 1988) (Tarasoff
duty runs only to intended victim and not to the patient); Hawkins v. King County Dep't of
Rehabilitative Serv., 24 Wash. App. 338, 345-46, 602 P.2d 361, 365-66 (1979) (attorney not
liable for failure to warn of client propensity for violence because victims knew of dangerous-
ness and she had no knowledge that client intended to assault anyone). Several commentators
have criticized Tarasoff, both because of the impact of disclosure on the psychotherapist/pa-
tient relationship and the difficulty of determining that a patient is dangerous. See, e.g.,
Abramovsky, supra note 12, at 20-22 (lawyers cannot predict dangerousness, and disclosure
may violate fifth and sixth amendments); Merton, Confidentiality and the "Dangerous" Pa-
tient: Implications of Tarasoff for Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 31 EMORY L.J. 263 (1982)
(Merton also urges caution in extending Tarasoff). Others do not find those concerns compel-
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harm may have a less compelling basis for disclosure, as reflected by the fact
that the Model Rules do not provide for such disclosure.' However, law-
yers have been advised that they may breach confidences involving those
crimes without legal consequence.' 09 In those states where the professional
legal ethics code provides that an attorney may report all crimes, their
supreme courts have already performed the balancing test and have made
the policy determination that such disclosures are appropriate."' Conse-
quently, those same courts would not hold a lawyer liable for following the
suggestion in the Model Code."'
For this reason, disciplinary boards probably would not hold a lawyer
responsible for disclosures made to protect herself against claims by cli-
ents112 or others, 31 3 or to help her collect a fee. 14 To reduce the likelihood
that unnecessary harm would result from such disclosures, courts have lim-
ling. See Givelber, Bowers & Blitch, Tarasoff, Myth and Reality. An Empirical Study of Pri-
vate Law in Action, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 443. Some commentators advocate that Tarasoff
liability be extended to attorneys. See Anderson, Laywers: A Call to Duty, 17 MEM. ST. U.L.
REV. 33 (1986); Sands, The Attorney's Affirmative Duty to Warn Foreseeable Victims of a Cli-
ent's Intended Violent Assault, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 355 (1986); Note, The Attorney's Duty to
Reveal a Client's Intended Future Criminal Conduct, 1984 DUKE L.J. 582.
108. Compare MODEL RULES, supra note 11, at Rule 1.6(b)(1) (exception to confidentiality
only where future crime involves likelihood of substantial bodily harm or death) with MODEL
CODE, supra note 3, at DR 4-101(C)(3) (exception for any future crime).
109. See, e.g., Ill. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Op. 87-9 (Mar.
11, 1988) (lawyer may disclose client's intention to remove child from jurisdiction in violation
of a court order); Mich. State Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. CI 1084 (Mar. 15, 1985)
(lawyer must disclose criminal activity prohibited by federal food and drug laws).
110. The supreme court of a state is ultimately responsible for promulgating ethics rules.
See supra note 67.
111. Of course, if the lawyer clearly abused her discretion and disclosed for improper pur-
poses, she could be held responsible. See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
112. Cf Tasby v. United.States, 504 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1974) (lawyer may disclose in
proceeding alleging ineffective assistance of counsel), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1125 (1975); In re
Gillham, 216 Mont. 279, 704 P.2d 1019 (1985) (same). See generally C. WOLFRAM, supra note
10, at 307-08; Levine & Committere, Self-Interest or Self-Defense: Lawyer Disregard of the
Attorney-Client Privilege for Profit and Protection, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 783 (1977).
113. See, e.g., Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1974)
(attorney may disclose confidences of corporation to purchasers of stock suing law firm for
breach of fiduciary duty), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1975); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 110 F.R.D. 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (attorney may disclose
confidences in suit against him brought by third party); In re Friend, 411 F. Supp. 776
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (attorney target of grand jury may disclose); General Realty Ass'n v. Walters,
519 N.Y.S.2d 530 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987) (lawyer may testify against client in eviction action
although he is not defendant, because tenant's claim he did not notify her of eviction implies he
neglected his responsibilities); Maine Bar Ass'n Prof. Ethics Comm. Op. 55 (1985) (lawyer
may reveal germane confidence to grievance commission). See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 10, at
309-10; Levine & Committere, supra note 112, at 804-06 (noting that Model Code exception as
applied to challenges by third parties or challenges prior to indictment or other litigation is
broad extension of common law rule).
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ited disclosures for these purposes to only those confidences necessary to
achieve the result contemplated by the rules." 5
More interesting than the tautological argument that the balance must be
struck in favor of disclosure where an exception to the rules has been crafted
is the question of whether those exceptions make sense. A deontological
analysis would suggest that disclosure of confidences should not be lightly
undertaken. As indicated above, the right to autonomy, which lawyers ar-
guably compromise by disclosure," 6 is a prima facie right entitled to great
deference." 7 Thus, a heavy burden of justification rests with the person ad-
vocating disclosure."'
Disclosure of future crimes involving death or serious bodily harm is most
clearly justified and should be mandated. 9 The right to life or bodily integ-
rity is immediate and substantial. By contrast, the client has a less substan-
tial interest in autonomy or the related right to privacy, because any right to
114. See, e.g., Nakasian v. Incontrade, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1220 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (lawyer not
prevented by ethical canons from disclosure in order to attach client funds); Zimmerman v.
Kallimopoulou, 56 Misc. 2d 828, 290 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Civ. Ct. 1967); Griffith v. Geffen &
Jacobson, 693 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (fee agreement not induced by duress because
lawyer threatened to disclose information and to withhold files absent payment because he had
right to do both); State Bar of Ga. Advisory Op. 49 (1985) (attorney may disclose necessary
client confidences to collection agency); see also C. WOLFRAM, supra note 10, at 308; see gener-
ally Levine & Committere, supra note 112.
115. See, e.g., First Fed. Say., 110 F.R.D. 557 (reasonably necessary disclosures for self
defense appropriate); Florida Bar v. Ball, 406 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1981) (attorney suspended for
disclosing confidences to social worker following fee dispute); Conduct of Jordan, 300 Or. 430,
712 P.2d 97 (1985) (attorney disbarred for, among other things, using client confidences to aid
other creditors as well as himself in collecting fees). Cf Levin v. Ripple Twist Mills, Inc., 416
F. Supp. 876 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (denying motion to disqualify but disapproving of use of privi-
leged materials from unrelated suits tending to show ex-client's propensity to perceive
improprieties).
116. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
118. R. WRIGHT, supra note 13, at 98. See Subin, supra note 10, at 1159-60. Professor
Freedman has asserted that the drafters of the Model Rules had misplaced priorities and has
offered his own suggestion regarding confidentiality exceptions: disclosure should be required
to save human life; it should be permitted to obey rules or court orders after all efforts to
challenge the validity of the order have been exhausted, and to defend the lawyer against
formal charges brought by the client. Disclosure should be forbidden to avoid third party
monetary loss, to rectify a fraud on the court, or to collect a fee. Freedman, Lawyer-Client
Confidences Under the A.B.A. Model Rules: Ethical Rules Without Ethical Reason, CRIM.
JUST. ETHICS, summer/fall 1984, 3, 7-8 (1984).
119. The Model Rules require disclosure only regarding perjury. MODEL RULES, supra
note 11, at Rule 3.3. This indicates an alarming misplacement of priorities. See Freedman,
supra note 118, at 7-8 (advocating mandatory disclosure of future crimes involving death or
serious bodily harm); Landesman, supra note 12, at 209 (same); Subin, supra note 10, at 1172-
75 (disclosure of all felonies should be mandatory).
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autonomy in dealing with the constraints of the legal system should not ap-
ply to illicit acts that the law forbids the client to perform.' 2°
A utilitarian analysis produces the same result. Courts should strike the
balance in favor of preventing imminent danger to life or bodily integrity as
against the possibility that, in the future, fewer clients may confide.' 1 '
Further, courts should permit discretion regarding exposing other future
crimes or frauds.' 22 A refusal to allow the lawyer to exercise her discretion
rests on an abstract notion that no set of circumstances exists under which
the rights of others outweigh the rights of clients. Allowing the attorney
discretion to determine whether she should make disclosures would enable
her to evaluate the strength of the rights of third parties in concrete and
varied circumstances, as a deontological approach would require. 123 Fur-
ther, it would reaffirm the notion that clients are not entitled to make certain
autonomous choices when those choices infringe on the autonomy of others.
Thus, an attorney should not be civilly liable or subject to discipline absent
an abuse of her discretion.
124
120. As Professor Subin observed:
The absolutists' rejection of the exception compels them to defend the ludicrous
proposition that to preserve the individual's access to the legal system, the individual
must be protected against disclosure of his attempts to subvert it. The client may
have the 'power' to subvert the process, but surely has no 'right' to do so.
Subin, supra note 10, at 1162 (footnote omitted). See also Moore, supra note 12, at 207 (auton-
omy within the law suggests lawyers ought not interfere unless client intends act he has no
legal right to perform).
121. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. For an economic analysis of maintaining
confidences, see Shavell, Legal Advice About Contemplated Acts.- The Decision to Obtain Ad-
vice, Its Social Desirability, and Protection of Confidentiality. 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 123 (1988).
See Landesman, supra note 12, at 208 (challenging utilitarian argument that clients will not
confide and harm will occur).
122. Landesman, supra note 12, at 209; Moore, supra note 12, at 225 (discretion regarding
crimes not involving substantial bodily harm); Subin, supra note 10, at 1175-76 (discretion
regarding minor crimes is advocated). Although the confidentiality requirements generally do
not exempt future frauds from confidential protection, the attorney-client privilege does ex-
empt them. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. Some jurisdictions do allow disclosure
of future frauds. Id.
123. It is very difficult, if not impossible, for one to analyze conflicting rights in the ab-
stract. See infra note 191. Cf Moore, supra note 12, at 224 (distinction Model Rules draw
between crimes involving serious bodily harm and those involving other substantial harm is
not philosophically sound). One should note, however, that a recognition of the relevance of
consequences does not imply an adoption of a utilitarian theory. See supra notes 25-29 and
accompanying text.
124. One may argue it is unfair to lawyers to adopt a vague, discretion-based test. This
standard already applies to lawyers, however, because most confidentiality exceptions are per-
missive, and case law is unanimous in providing that where the professional is permitted but
not required to disclose, she must show that a balance should be struck in favor of disclosure.
See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
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If one employs a utilitarian analysis, discretion would allow the lawyer to
compare carefully the consequences of a future act to the short and long-
term harm caused by exposure of information. In fact, some future acts,
such as adoption of a defective product design, may be neither criminal nor
fraudulent but nevertheless may have a severe impact upon the rights of
third parties. 2 5 Lawyers should, therefore, have discretion to report those
acts as well.
Most legal ethics codes prohibit the disclosure of past crime or fraud, even
if the client used the attorney's services, unless the client perpetrated the
fraud on a tribunal.' 2 6 The lawyer should have discretion to disclose past
crimes or frauds in which she played a role. Attorneys as well as clients are
autonomous moral agents;' 27 they should have the right to choose to rectify
harm they have caused or in which they have participated.' 2 8
125. Professor Zacharias provides two examples of such behavior. Clients and lawyers
were asked whether a lawyer should disclose if a client produces a metal alloy for planes which
meets government standards but may explode at high altitudes. They were also asked if the
lawyer should disclose that the client knows that a certain percentage of its gas tanks will
explode, but decides that it can pay off claims more efficiently than fix the defect. Interest-
ingly, only 24% of lawyers surveyed thought that a lawyer should disclose the defective alloy,
yet over 85% of the clients thought that the parties should disclose. Zacharias, supra note 6, at
389-96. In a case of this nature, Moore concludes that the balance tips toward disclosure.
Moore, supra note 12, at 231-33.
126. See ALAS REPORT, supra note 34, at 45-51. There are varying rules regarding past
fraud on a tribunal. Model Code DR 7-102(B) was originally drafted to require disclosure, as
does Model Rule 3.3. Some commentators believed such a rule went too far and indicated that
the Model Code should not require disclosure where the attorney-client privilege protected
information. The ABA drafted a clause excepting privileged material from disclosure, but
later read the rule as precluding disclosure of both confidences and secrets. See ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975). See Moore, supra note 12,
at 218 n.192. The attorney may be required to withdraw, see In re A, 276 Or. 225, 554 P.2d
479 (1976), or at least to refrain from using perjured testimony. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE, Standard 4-7.7 (1986) (Standard for the Defense Function). For a description
of various states' positions regarding perjury, see supra note 67 and accompanying text.
Landesman and Moore appear to agree that lawyers should generally disclose perjury, either
because the client has no right to engage in such behavior, or because the rights of third parties
or the system outweigh client rights. Landesman, supra note 12, at 209-10; Moore, supra note
12, at 219.
127. Luban, supra note 28, at 637-43; Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice
and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29, 130-44; Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals:
Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1 (1975).
128. Of course, the lawyer may be subject to discipline or to civil liability if she abuses her
discretion. The right to disclose is most compelling where the client uses the unwitting lawyer
to carry out fraud on a tribunal, both because the client affected the lawyer's autonomy and
because the client did not repose the confidence in her that is supposedly protected by the
privilege. Moore, supra note 12, at 238-39. Even if the lawyer knew of the fraud, the system
should allow her to rectify the harm she has caused.
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Arguments for disclosure to avoid attorney malpractice liability or to col-
lect fees are less compelling. Commentators, however, have justified both
arguments by stating that the client has waived his rights by suing or refus-
ing to pay a fee.12 9 While this argument may have merit where the client is
malevolent and the attorney is blameless,"'3 it does not give sufficient weight
to the notion that, in many cases, the client has good reason to sue or to
refuse to pay a legal fee.1 ' In such cases, perhaps the client should not be
required to pay for the right to bring such claims with disclosure of his confi-
dences. Moreover, a totally innocent client may have confidences disclosed
because a third party has made a claim against the lawyer. 1
32
In fact, these protective rules are inherently suspect: No one has articu-
lated why an attorney's rights should override those of the clients while
those of other innocent parties do not.1 33 The rules arguably demonstrate
the drafters' preferential treatment of their colleagues.
129. M. BAYLES, supra note 9, at 85; C. WOLFRAM, supra note 10, at 308-09. See MODEL
RULES, supra note 11, at Rule 1.6 comment (client may not exploit fiduciary relationship).
130. In such a case it could be argued that the prima facie duty of reparation supports an
exception for fees and the duty of justice supports the self defense exception. See W.D. Ross,
supra note 13, at 19-20 (description of prima facie duties). Assuming those duties are impli-
cated, they still must be carefully balanced against the right to autonomy to reach the proper
result in a given case. See supra note 29. See Levine & Committere, supra note 112, at 826-29
(complexity of factors to be considered in determining whether the fee and self defense excep-
tions should be made precludes rigid rule; judge should make finding that disclosure necessary
and in interest of justice).
131. See Moore, supra note 12, at 224-25 n.225 (clients who question lawyer fees are not
necessarily wrongdoers). Compare Kriegsman v. Kriegsman, 150 N.J. Super. 474, 375 A.2d
1253 (1977) (lawyer may not withdraw from representation where client's failure to pay fee is
not culpable), with Holmes v. Y.J.A. Realty Corp., 128 A.D.2d 482, 513 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1987)
(withdrawal permitted where client able to pay but does not).
132. See MODEL RULES, supra note 11, at Rule 1.6(b)(2); MODEL CODE, supra note 3, at
DR 4-1O(C)(4); C. WOLFRAM, supra note 10, at 309-10. See Levine & Committere, supra
note 112, at 816 ("only when the attorney and client are in direct opposition can the client be
accused of taking advantage of the privilege..."). The right to disclose may be stronger where
the client exploited the lawyer. See supra note 129.
133. Landesman, supra note 12, at 193 (protecting confidentiality means sacrificing other
aims; special significance of self defense exceptions needs further justification because lawyers'
interests protected and other innocent third party interests are not); Levine & Committere,
supra note 112, at 812 (difficult to justify rule that would prevent attorney from reporting
communications useful to falsely accused non-client or to tradesman seeking payment for serv-
ices to client, while attorney may disclose when she is accused of wrongdoing or expects pay-
ment); Moore, supra note 12, at 224-25 n.225 (obvious discrepancy between virtually absolute
duty of confidentiality where third parties are concerned and lack of such duty when lawyers'
interests implicated); Subin, supra note 10, at 1112 (difficult to understand why lawyers but not
others are protected). Levine suggests that judges rather than lawyers should determine
whether disclosures for self protection or fees should be made, balancing the harm to the client




Thus, although a lawyer may sometimes be justified in disclosing for her
own benefit,' 3 4 code drafters should carefully consider the rights of clients
and evaluate the consequences of disclosure in various circumstances.
Where the lawyer's interests do not outweigh the client's interest in main-
taining confidences, the exception allowing disclosures should not apply.
Regardless of how confidentiality rules ultimately are promulgated, how-
ever, it is reasonably clear that a court will not discipline an attorney or hold
her civilly liable for disclosures as long as they fall within a category listed as
an exception to the requirement of keeping confidences.
IV. INFORMED CONSENT AND DISCLOSURE OF LIMITS TO CONFIDENCE
The crux of a client's complaint against a lawyer for divulging his secrets
is that the client never would have entrusted the lawyer with private infor-
mation had the client known the lawyer would share it with others. The
client would claim that his decision to share information was not an in-
formed one, because he was not told of the material fact that the lawyer
might not hold all confidences inviolate.
1 35
The legal profession only slowly recognized that a general requirement of
informed consent should exist with respect to decisions made by clients. 
36
134. The most compelling set of circumstances for disclosure would occur when the client
deceives the lawyer and implicates her in a fraud, because the client has violated the lawyer's
autonomy. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text; see also Moore, supra note 12, at
240.
135. This claim differs from more typical informed consent claims which focus on a profes-
sional performing services, seemingly for the good of the client or patient, without informing
him of risks and alternatives. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972) (laminectomy performed and patient unaware of risks), Kushner
v. McLarty, 165 Ga. App. 400, 300 S.E.2d 531 (1983) (contract drafted without advising client
of consequences of terminology used), aff'd, 173 Ga. App. 432, 326 S.E.2d 777 (1985). How-
ever, because the point of informed consent is to maintain autonomous decisionmaking, the
rationale behind the theory is equally applicable in the context of limitations on confidentiality.'
See infra notes 156-68 and accompanying text. In fact, informed consent may be more impor-
tant in this context because a clear conflict of interest arises between lawyer and client. See
infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text. Failure to allow an informed consent is analogous
to deception, as evidenced by a client's feeling of betrayal. See infra notes 169-71 and accom-
panying text.
136. The Model Code has long required that informed consent be obtained before a lawyer
may represent conflicting interests. See MODEL CODE, supra note 3, at DR 5-101, 5-105. See
infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text. Further, courts have also made clear that clients
must consent to settlements or plea bargains. See infra note 139. However, generalized recog-
nition of the necessity of informed consent in legal practice has occurred only in the last ten
years. See Andersen, Informed Decisionmaking in an Office Practice, 28 B.C.L. REV. 225
(1987); Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 307 (1980);
Maute, Allocation of Decisionmaking Authority Under the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, 17 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1049 (1984); Peck, A New Tort Liability for Lack of Informed
Consent in Legal Matters, 44 LA. L. REv. 1289 (1984); Spiegel, The New Model Rules of
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Few cases articulate the basis for finding a duty to provide an opportunity
for informed consent in a legal context. t37 Today, however, the legal profes-
sion clearly recognizes such a duty. Model Rule 1.4 provides that "[a] law-
yer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the
client to make informed decisions regarding the representation."
' 138
Of course, not all information must be communicated to the client. Only
information reasonably necessary for informed decisionmaking must be pro-
Professional Conduct: Lawyer-Client Decision Making and the Role of Rules in Structuring the
Lawyer-Client Dialogue, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1003 [hereinafter Spiegel, Lawyer-Client
Dialogue]; Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking. Informed Consent and the Legal
Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41 (1979) [hereinafter Spiegel, Informed Consent]; Strauss,
Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65
N.C.L. REV. 315 (1987).
Conversely, medical literature has grappled with informed consent since the 1960's. Id. at
316. The first judicial opinion to use the term "informed consent" was Salgo v. Leland Stan-
ford Jr. College Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957). Strauss, supra, at
316. An enormous amount of scholarship has been generated regarding informed consent in
the medical arena. See, e.g., R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 13; C. LIDZ, A. MEI-
SEL, E. ZERUBANEL, M. CARTER, R. SESTAK, & L. ROTH, INFORMED CONSENT, A STUDY IN
DECISIONMAKING IN PSYCHIATRY (1984) [hereinafter C. LIDZ]; J. LUDLAM, INFORMED
CONSENT (1978); R. WRIGHT, supra note 13, at 84-105; T. MAPPES & J. ZEMBATY, supra note
13, at 44-64; A. ROSOFF, INFORMED CONSENT: A GUIDE FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
(1981); Carpenter, A New Setting for Informed Consent, THE LANCET, Mar. 23, 1974, at 500;
Epstein & Lasagna, Obtaining Informed Consent.- Form or Substance, 123 ARCHIVES OF IN-
TERNAL MED. 682 (1969); Faden, Disclosure & Informed Consent.- Does It Matter How We
Tell It?, 5 HEALTH EDUC. MONOGRAPHS 198 (1977); Hassar & Weintraub, "Uninformed"
Consent and the Wealthy Volunteer An Analysis of Patient Volunteers in a Clinical Trial of a
New Anti-Inflammatory Drug, 20 CLINICAL PHARMOCOLOGY THERAPEUTICS 379 (1976);
Laforet, The Fiction of Informed Consent, 235 J. A.M.A. 1579 (1976); Leeb, Bowers & Lynch,
Observations on the Myth of "Informed Consent," 58 PLASTIC RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY
280 (1976); Olin & Olin, Informed Consent in Voluntary Mental Hospital Admissions, 132 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 938 (1975); Smith, Myocardial Infarction - Case Studies of Ethics in the Con-
sent Situation, 8 Soc. SCI. & MED. 399 (1974); Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to
Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628, 637 (1970); Comment, Informed Consent in Medical Mal-
practice, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1396 (1967).
137. Early cases of legal malpractice stressed the special duties arising from the fiduciary
nature of the relationship, and the potential for usurpation of authority absent a high standard
of trust and devotion. See, e.g., Nocton v. Lord Ashburton, 1914 A.C. 932; Martyn, supra
note 136, at 323. Later cases, using the developing concept of negligence, stressed customary
skill. Id. at 324. Today, lack of informed consent in the legal context arises almost exclusively
where there is either a failure to disclose conflicts of interest or to communicate settlement
offers. See infra notes 139, 153-55. But see infra note 165; Spector v. Marmelstein, 485 F.2d
474 (2d Cir. 1973) (failure to advise regarding risks of loan); Kushner v. McLarty, 165 Ga.
App. 400, 300 S.E.2d 531 (1983) (failure to inform of consequences of using terminology),
aff'd, 173 Ga. App. 432, 326 S.E.2d 777 (1985).
138. MODEL RULES, supra note 11, at Rule 1.4 (emphasis added). Ethical Consideration
7-8 provides that a lawyer "should exert his best efforts to insure that the decisions of his client
are made only after the client has been informed of relevant considerations." MODEL CODE,
supra note 3, at EC 7-8.
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vided. Thus, the principal question is whether information regarding the
possibility of disclosure is of the type that an attorney must share. In the
context of this Article, the question is who should make the decision of
whether a client will give an attorney information that the attorney may
later disclose.
A. Allocation of the Decisionmaking Functions
The classic formulation regarding allocation of decisionmaking functions
calls for the lawyer to make "procedural" or "tactical" decisions while the
client retains authority over "substantive" issues, such as accepting or re-
jecting settlements or plea bargains.139 Commentators sometimes character-
ize this formulation as a "means/ends" dichotomy."4
One could argue that the decision whether to disclose client confidences
demands an examination of personal and professional ethics that transcends
the attorney-client relationship. The fact that client consent is only one of
several available exceptions to the rule requiring maintenance of confidences
supports this conclusion. Thus, one could view the decision whether to in-
form the client about the possibility of disclosure as akin to a tactical, profes-
sional decision, rather than a substantive client decision. If so, the attorney
can decide to disclose without consulting the client.
Such an analysis begs the question. No one disputes that, at times, disclo-
sure is morally and legally appropriate (or even mandated), and that client
input cannot be dispositive.' 4 1 Instead, a determination by the lawyer
whether she should disclose a matter must occur only after a careful analysis
of the competing rights at stake. 142 However, while the question whether to
warn the client about the possibility of such disclosure is related to the ques-
tion of propriety of the disclosure itself, it is not identical. Rather than con-
flating the two questions, the lawyer must separately consider the rights of
139. See, e.g., Staatz v. Dupnek, 789 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1986) (defendant bound by tactical
decisions by counsel); Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1010
(1985) (duty to convey settlement offer recognized, but court concluded attorney met duty);
Whitaker v. State of Iowa, 382 N.W.2d 112 (Iowa 1986) (attorney must advise of settlement
offer); Joos v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 94 Mich. App. 419, 288 N.W.2d 443 (1980) (attorney has
duty as a matter of law to communicate good faith settlement offers); Rizzo v. Haines, 520 Pa.
484, 555 A.2d 58 (1989) (attorney must communicate and investigate settlement offers);
Senyshyn v. Karlak, 450 Pa. 535, 299 A.2d 294 (1973) (attorney could not enter consent de-
cree without permission); see generally Maute, supra note 136, at 1063-66; Speigel, Informed
Consent, supra note 136, at 50-64; Strauss, supra note 136, at 318-21.
140. Spiegel, Informed Consent, supra note 136, at 101-03; Strauss, supra note 136, at 318-
21.
141. See MODEL CODE, supra note 3, at DR 4-101(C); MODEL RULES, supra note 11, at
Rule 1.6(b); see also supra notes 119-34 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 116-34 and accompanying text.
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the client to information regarding limits on confidentiality versus the poten-
tial damage to her own rights or those of third parties if she provides that
information and, as a result, the client does not speak openly to her. '
43
Most commentators recognize that the tactics/substance dichotomy can-
not be dispositive in determining whether the client should have the right to
decide.'" First, courts have deviated from this formula when necessary to
protect third party expectations or judicial administration. 145 Second, and
more important, the dichotomy does not provide for the instance when a
seemingly pure tactical decision implicates substantive rights. 146 Thus, the
artificial distinction between tactics and substance should be abandoned and
replaced with a presumption that a client must be given the opportunity to
provide his informed consent whenever the client would find the information
material to his decisionmaking.1
4
1
Although the Model Rules continue to base distinctions regarding deci-
sionmaking upon the substance/procedure dichotomy, a limited recognition
does exist that the client has an interest in determining even procedural is-
sues. For example, although the lawyer has ultimate authority regarding the
means of representation, Model Rule 1.2(a) requires that she consult with
the client regarding those issues. 141 Moreover, Rule 1.2(e) requires that the
143. See W.D. Ross, supra note 13, at 19 (actor confronted with conflicting prima facie
duties must study the particular situation in which the conflict arises so that he may form a
considered opinion regarding which right takes precedence).
144. See, e.g., Maute, supra note 136, at 1080-1105; Spiegel, Informed Consent, supra note
136, at 72-133; Strauss, supra note 136, at 324-26; 336-49.
145. Spiegel, Informed Consent, supra note 136, at 63.
146. Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 454, 458-59; Maute,
supra note 136, at 1061-62; Strauss, supra note 136, at 324-26. As an example of a situation in
which a "tactical" decision matters to the client as much as the result does, Strauss cites a
hypothetical suggested by Professor David Luban: an innocent client being prosecuted for
murder forbids his lawyer from calling his best friend's wife, with whom he had been having an
affair, as an alibi witness because he does not want anyone to know he had been with her. Id.
at 325. Strauss offers other examples: the client might be embarrassed to use an insanity
defense; he might not want the stress of continuances advised by the lawyer; or he may want
arguments raised although the chances of success are low. Id. For other examples, see Luban,
supra, at 454-59. One could find numerous examples of situations in which clients care about
the tactics or means employed. Id. One immediately coming to mind is that persons engaged
in a long-term relationship may wish to resolve controversies as amicably as possible, while a
lawyer may wish to play hardball to get the best deal for his client. Id. at 455. See also Maute,
supra note 136, at 1061 (clear distinction between ends and means impossible).
147. See Andersen, supra note 136, at 233 (subjective standard which takes into account
wishes of individual client best protects autonomy); Martyn, supra note 136, at 348-49 (advo-
cating that standard for informed consent should be subjective expectations of client); Spiegel,
Lawyer-Client Dialogue, supra note 136, at 1006 (attorney must consider when it is reasonable
to assume client would want to participate in decisionmaking); Strauss, supra note 136, at 341
(even traditional disclosure of risks and benefits gives attorney great discretion).
148. MODEL RULES, supra note 11, at Rule 1.2(a).
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lawyer consult with the client regarding legal restraints against pursuing cli-
ent goals. 149
Thus, some understand that the relationship resembles a cooperative,
"joint venture" between lawyer and client. 50 Commentators who have con-
sidered this issue argue that the appropriate focus centers upon the expecta-
tions of the client, rather than upon whether a lawyer customarily makes
decisions of the type contemplated.15' Therefore, rather than determining
that an issue is "technical" or "procedural," the inquiry should focus on
whether the client would consider the information material to his decision-
making. Using this analysis helps to assure that the lawyer treats her client
149. Id. at Rule 1.2(e). Furthermore, Rule 1.2(c) allows the lawyer to limit client objec-
tives with client consent. Id. at Rule 1.2(c).
150. See Maute, supra note 136, at 1080. Professor Maute uses this nomenclature to de-
scribe the allocation of the decisionmaking authority under the Model Rules. Id. She finds
that decisionmaking is shared, but that client and lawyer each have presumptive spheres of
authority. Id. at 1066. The client has ultimate authority over objectives, which include "the
client's overall purpose or desired result, other matters affecting the client's legal rights, obliga-
tions or financial interests, and subjective concerns, including business, political, moral, or
personal values." Id. at 1063. The lawyer has presumptive authority over legal, tactical, and
technical issues, and may override client choice where prohibited by law from aiding it. Id. at
1064-66. Thus, the means/ends distinctions remain relevant to Professor Maute, with two
important clarifications. First, "ends" are interpreted more broadly to comport with client
expectations. Second, communication must occur even with respect to "technical" issues, and
borderline questions should be resolved through consensus or compromise to avoid the lawyer
or client encroaching upon the authority of the other. Id. at 1061. Professor Shaffer recog-
nizes that, although lawyer and client are autonomous moral agents, their relationship is a
mutually dependent one. Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE DAME
LAWYER 231, 246 (1979). He rejects the notion that a lawyer must either patronize the client
and make decisions for him, defer to the client at all costs, or isolate himself from the client by
withdrawing his aid. Id. at 234-37. Instead, he advocates the collaborative model of a contin-
uing moral dialogue between lawyer and client. Id. at 248-50, 252-53.
151. Such a shift in emphasis would track developments in informed consent in the medical
profession. See Martyn, supra note 136, at 333-40. Prior to the decision in Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1060 (1972), reasonableness of
disclosures was examined in light of medical custom; that is, from the perspective of doctors
rather than patients. See Martyn, supra note 136, at 336. In Canterbury, recognizing the
fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship and the primacy of patient expectations, the
court held that "the patient's right of self-decision [is] the factor that determines the scope of
the duty to reveal." Id. at 337. See also Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786. Under the Canterbury
approach, the scope of the requirement of informed consent in medical practice is now deter-
mined not by the custom of medical professionals but by the patient's right to information
necessary for making an intelligent choice. Martyn, supra note 136, at 338. Canterbury did
not go far enough because it used an objective standard of materiality rather than a subjective
inquiry into the client's needs. Compare id. at 338 n.196 with Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 2d 229,
245, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972) (materiality to be determined by reference
to subjecture patient needs).
1990]
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as another human being engaged in a cooperative endeavor with her rather
than simply as a means by which to exercise her professional skill."i 2
In fact, one need not go far beyond the traditional rules regarding in-
formed consent in the practice of law to conclude that the lawyer must warn
the client regarding how the lawyer may use the client's confidences. Courts
have long required a client's informed consent when a conflict of interest
exists.153 An informed consent requirement regarding conflicts serves the
critical purpose of reducing the ability of a lawyer to overstep her authority
and take unfair advantage of the client. 154 The lawyer resolves a conflict in
favor of third parties or the legal system and against her client when she
reports crimes or frauds, and she resolves the conflict in favor of herself
when she discloses to defend herself or to collect a fee. Given that substan-
tive client rights may be affected, the possibility of disclosure is material.
Therefore, a presumption should arise that attorneys must make the client
aware of potential conflicts and how both parties may resolve them.
155
B. Justifying the Imposition of a Duty to Inform About Limits to
Confidentiality
To provide a philosophical framework for the imposition of a duty to in-
form, one must consider the rights affected by failure to apprise of limits to
confidentiality and those rights affected if the lawyer describes those limits.
Commentators unanimously recognize that the principle of autonomy and
its concomitant right of self-determination provide a moral justification for
152. Professor Shaffer, using nomenclature articulated by Martin Buber, explains that the
morally right and emotionally satisfying relationship between two persons is an "I-Thou" rela-
tionship, a mutually dependent and cooperative one. Shaffer, Legal Ethics and the Good Cli-
ent, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 319, 319-20 (1987). However, he claims relationships between
professionals and laypersons often degenerate into an "I-It" relationship, where the profes-
sional does all the counselling and refuses to be counselled. Id. This approach fails to recog-
nize that clients can be a source of sound morality to lawyers, and it promotes hubris on the
part of lawyers. Id.
153. Spiegel, Informed Consent, supra note 136, at 68, 72. See, e.g., Unified Sewerage
Agency of Wash. County v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Jones, 103
Idaho 702, 652 P.2d 650 (1982); Phillips v. Carson, 240 Kan. 462, 731 P.2d 820 (1987); Hart-
ford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So. 2d 255 (Miss. 1988); Bankers Trust of S.C. v.
Bruce, 283 S.C. 408, 323 S.E.2d 523 (1984).
154. Martyn, supra note 136, at 313; Strauss, supra note 136, at 329-30, 343 (even assuming
attorneys adequately recognize client interests, professional, moral or economic self interest
may influence the choices that lawyers make; imposing informed consent requirements lessens
incentive for coercion).
155. See Spiegel, Informed Consent, supra note 136, at 123 (when a client's values are likely
to be implicated or an attorney's professional loyalty is suspect, the client should make the
decision).
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informed consent in the legal profession.'" 6 As Gerald Dworkin explains,
the ability to make our own decisions reaffirms our sense that we are individ-
uals able to control our own destiny.' 57 Thus, autonomy is a good in itself,
which should not be overcome absent the strongest of countervailing
rights. 58
Closely tied to the concept of autonomy is the requirement of veracity."5 9
To fulfill that duty, fiduciaries clearly owe their principals not only an ab-
sence of active deception, but the affirmative obligation of candor.'
160
Whether a lawyer purposely makes misstatements or intentionally withholds
information,' 6 ' failure to disclose is morally problematic because it involves
professionals trying to build and encourage trust and then using it to
deceive.' 62 Thus, deception in the attorney-client setting includes both ac-
tive misstatements and failure to disclose material information.'
63
156. See, e.g., Martyn, supra note 136, at 311-12 (autonomy recognized as moral right and
as basis for exercise of legal rights); Strauss, supra note 136, at 336-39 (explaining deontologi-
cal and utilitarian justifications for autonomy); see also supra notes 14-16 and accompanying
text.
157. Dworkin, Autonomy and Informed Consent, in PRESIDENT'S COMM. FOR THE STUDY
OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE & BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIOR RESEARCH, 3 MAKING
HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CON-
SENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 74 (1982), quoted in Strauss, supra note
136, at 337. Thus, autonomy is justifiable as a good in itself. Dworkin, supra, at 73-74. More-
over, principles of utility justify-informed consent: they assure that individual choice is maxi-
mized, resulting in client satisfaction; attorney and client are protected from the dangers of
poor communication; the public may be less skeptical of the legal profession; and they en-
courage self-scrutiny. Strauss, supra note 136, at 338. See Martyn, supra note 136, at 318-21
(informed consent increases self-scrutiny and public involvement in affairs of profession).
158. Strauss, supra note 136, at 340. Professor Strauss's argument is consistent with the
notion articulated by W.D. Ross that a presumption exists, absent stronger opposing rights,
that prima facie rights must be vindicated. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
159. Some philosophers question whether the rights to veracity and autonomy are of equal
force, or whether veracity is simply a means by which autonomy may be achieved. See T.
BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 25, at 307-08 (comparing G. J. Warnock's view that
veracity is an independent moral principle with Henry Sidgewick's conclusion that veracity is
merely a special application of other principles). Ross concludes that the prima facie duty of
fidelity is based upon a promise not to lie, which can be implied from the act of entering
civilized conversation. W.D. Ross, supra note 13, at 21. See T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS,
supra, note 25, at 308 (we implicitly promise we will speak truthfully when we communicate
with others).
160. M. BAYLES, supra note 9, at 72.
161. The crux of deception is intention. S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE LIFE 6-8 (1978).
162. R. WRIGHT, supra note 13, at 94.
163. Id. "When we undertake to deceive others intentionally, we communicate messages
meant to mislead them .... We can do so through gesture, through disguise, by means of
action or inaction, even through silence." S. BOK, supra note 161, at 13.
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A client's right to veracity is compromised even when an attorney negli-
gently fails to disclose material facts' because she reduces a client's auton-
omy despite the fact that her motives are not venal. For this reason, some
courts have stated that an attorney must investigate matters to determine
what a client may find material.
165
Veracity is critical to the maintenance of autonomy because, although de-
ception does not implicate a person's ability to remain autonomous, it cer-
tainly implicates the ability to make autonomous choices. 166 The lack of
information creates two restrictions on autonomous decisionmaking: limit-
ing information limits choices, and, almost inevitably, the client will be
manipulated when an attorney withholds or gives incorrect information.
167
Commentators have recognized the anomaly of defending confidentiality on
the basis of autonomy while simultaneously failing to explain to a client the
limits of such confidentiality.
1 68
164. Some may generally view a failure to speak as intentional, because attorneys are aware
of limitations on confidentiality. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. Nondisclosure is
not intentional, however, when an attorney mistakenly believes the information withheld is not
relevant to a client. While such a failure is perhaps not as morally culpable as deliberate
nondisclosure, it still violates client autonomy, which is the value underlying an attorney's
duty to inquire in order to determine what the client thinks is material. See infra text accom-
panying note 165, notes 209-13 and accompanying text; Martyn, supra note 136, at 323 (citing
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 208 (fiduciary has affirmative duty
to disclose facts and circumstances principal would find important)).
165. See, e.g., Kushner v. McLarty, 165 Ga. App. 400, 300 S.E.2d 531 (1983) (duty to
discuss terminology), aff'd, 173 Ga. App. 432, 326 S.E.2d 77 (1985); Rizzo v. Haines, 520 Pa.
181, 555 A.2d 58 (1989) (lawyer must investigate so that a client's decision to accept or reject
settlement offer will be informed). Moreover, actions for breach of fiduciary duty do not re-
quire intent. Martyn, supra note 136, at 321-22.
166. R. WRIGHT, supra note 13, at 95. Accord T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra
note 25, at 313. T. MAPPES & J. ZEMBATY, BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 57 (1981).
167. R. WRIGHT, supra note 13, at 95. The client has been manipulated because he expects
he has been told the truth. Id. at 95, 99. See Spiegel, Lawyer-Client Dialogue, supra note 136,
at 1005 (granting decisionmaking right to layperson without corresponding duty of communi-
cation undermines right). Bok equates deceit with violence and refers to them as "the two
forms of deliberate assault on human beings. Both can coerce people into acting against their
will." S. BoK, supra note 161, at 18 (footnote omitted). It thus gives unjust power to the
deceiver. Id. at 22. As Warnock explains, "the simplest and most seductive way[ ] of manipu-
lating and maneuvering other persons for the sake of one's own ends is that of thus operating
self-interestedly upon their beliefs." G.J. WARNOCK, THE OBJECT OF MORALITY 84 (1971).
See Shaffer, supra note 150, at 246-47 (lawyer should not use methods of influence which
interfere with ability of clients to reflect rationally; methods which rely on deception or client
ignorance should be avoided).
168. See Subin, supra note 10, at 1165-66 (autonomy requires disclosure of limits; promise
of confidentiality without intention to keep confidences defrauds the client). See Zacharias,
supra note 6, at 381 (to extent lawyers manipulate clients by assurance of absolute confidential-
ity, autonomy rationale for confidentiality is undercut). It has also been suggested that psychi-
atrists should warn patients of limits to confidentiality. See, e.g., Fleming & Maximov, supra
note 53, at 1056-60 (basing conclusion on power of psychiatrist, limited patient understanding
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An attorney's misstatements or failure to share material facts may have an
immediate and substantial impact upon the client's right to autonomy.
Moreover, discovering the deception may cause the client to alter his view of
the lawyer and perhaps of people generally. The client who discovers that
his lawyer has deceived him might become "resentful, disappointed and sus-
picious," '69 not only of his lawyer but also of others. 170 The fact that the
client put trust in his lawyer exacerbates the feelings of betrayal that inevita-
bly result and may exist regardless of whether the lawyer intended to mis-
lead her client.
17 1
Additional issues arise if lawyers willfully misrepresent or withhold infor-
mation.1 72 The misrepresentation or withholding may have an immediate
impact upon the attorney-client relationship, even if the client is still una-
ware of the deception. First, the lawyer may feel compelled to make addi-
tional false statements to avoid discovery of the original deception.'
73
Moreover, the attorney may become desensitized to the consequences of her
deception: "lies seem more necessary, less reprehensible; the ability to make
moral distinctions can coarsen; the liar's perception of his chances of being
of risks, and dependence and trust of patient); Accord, Note, Duty to Warn, supra note 95, at
155-56.
169. S. BOK, supra note 161, at 63 (discussing dangers of deception by using placebos in
drug experimentation).
170. Warnock explains:
It is, one might say, not the implanting of false beliefs that is damaging, but rather
the generation of the suspicion that they may be being implanted. For this under-
mines trust; and, to the extent that trust is undermined, all co-operative undertakings
... must tend to break down. I cannot reasonably be expected to go over the edge of
a cliff on a rope, for however vital an object, if I cannot trust you to keep hold of the
other end of it; there is no sense in my asking you for your opinion on some point, if I
do not suppose that your answer will actually express your opinion. (Verbal commu-
nication is doubtless the most important of all our co-operative undertakings.)
G.J. WARNOCK, supra note 167, at 84. Warnock's view is consistent with Aquinis' notion that
the evil in lying is the impact it has upon communication, the undertaking most indicative of
our status as human beings. T. AQUINIS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Art. I (I would like to thank
my colleague, Father Robert Kirtland, for translating Aquinis from Latin.) Warnock adds
that lying is especially dangerous because it is easy to do. As it is difficult to discriminate
between truthful persons and liars, uncertainty as to the credibility of any will infect relations
with all. G.J. WARNOCK, supra note 167, at 84.
171. Bok uses a literary example to illustrate her point: "[I]n Othello, . . . part of the
horror comes from the knowledge of the great trust Othello had for Iago and from the fact
lago played upon this trust: 'he holds me well, The better shall my purpose work on him.'"
S. BOK, supra note 161, at 88.
172. There are probably few situations where failure to speak should not be regarded as
intentional. See supra notes 6-8, 164 and accompanying text.
173. S. BOK, supra note 161, at 25. Bok observes that strains on the liar become greater as
time goes on, because it becomes more difficult to keep track of stories told. Id.
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caught may warp."' 74 Finally, the lawyer who successfully deceives may
view her client as being easily duped. Consequently, the attorney's respect
for the client as an autonomous moral agent may be reduced. '75 Perhaps she
may develop a general unwillingness to respect the client's rights, or those of
other clients.' 76 A lack of informed consent about the limits of confidential-
ity also presents an interesting irony: the lawyer makes a misrepresentation
regarding secrecy to clients to create an atmosphere encouraging candor. ' 77
Such lawyers "would prefer, in other words, a 'free-rider' status, giving them
the benefits of lying without the risks of being lied to."'7 8
It may be argued without reference to client autonomy that the very core
of the lawyer-client relationship is adversely affected by deception. Lawyer
and client are not isolated persons with separate lives; they are interdepen-
dent and engaged in a cooperative enterprise. 179 If the client views his law-
yer as a good person possessing wisdom, she is in a position to exert moral
influence.'8 ° Instead, deception changes the nature of the relationship, and
their allegiance to one another in the pursuit of a common goal is put into
question. 8 1 The client no longer views the lawyer as having integrity, and
he no longer views her as a dependable source of moral authority. 82
In sum, deception has the immediate effect of reducing client autonomy
and damaging the attorney-client relationship. The next question is whether
deception is ever justified. Although Kant would argue that one can never
174. Id.
175. The lawyer may reach this conclusion to reduce her own feelings of guilt. The attor-
ney may conclude it is the client's "fault" that deception was necessary, or the client's "fault"
that he is too dense to recognize the deception.
176. Disdain for the client's right or ability to make intelligent decisions may result even
when the lawyer lies for the client's "own good." The lawyer may come to view the client as
unable or unworthy to decide for himself. S. BOK, supra note 161, at 76.
177. See supra notes 1, 8 and accompanying text.
178. S. BOK, supra note 161, at 23.
179. See Shaffer, supra note 152, at 325.
180. Id.
181. A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 191-92 (1984).
182. Shaffer, supra note 152, at 330. According to Professor MacIntyre, this breakdown
has ramifications far beyond an individual relationship. He finds that individuals are influ-
enced by and derive their moral view from a shared tradition of the good in a community. A.
MACINTYRE, supra note 181, at 222-23. That tradition is a living, changing environment that
has been developed over generations from "practices," which are defined as complex, socially
established cooperative human activity intended to advance human experience. Id. at 187.
The cooperative relation between lawyer and client could be viewed as one such practice. See
generally Shaffer, supra note 152. As MacIntyre explains, if practices and institutions are cor-
rupted by untruthfulness, traditions will be corrupted as well. Individuals thus lose a reference
point for interpreting morality. A. MACINTYRE, supra note 181, at 233.
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accept deception," 3 most theorists recognize that it is excused in certain
circumstances.' 84 Seldom, however, can one justify deception regarding the
limits to confidentiality.
C. Justifying Exceptions to the Duty to Inform About Limits to
Confidentiality
Before considering the strength of the justifications for various deceptions,
a few general observations may be made. First, because veracity is a prima
facie right, the presumption of a right to nondeceptive information is strong,
and the burden of proof that deception is justified rests with the person who
intends to deceive.18 5 Next, in part because liars "tend to place a much
more benevolent interpretation on their own excuses than when they are on
the receiving end,"' 86 the proffered justification must withstand the test of
"publicity:" that is, it must appeal to a common, universal view of
propriety. 187
Deception is most justified when it avoids imminent bodily harm to a
third party. 188 The justification for deception here is threefold: limited time
is available to evaluate alternatives; the avoidance of harm creates a strong
countervailing duty; and the deception typically occurs in such isolated in-
183. Kant finds the duty of truthfulness "a sacred and absolutely commanding degree of
reason, limited by no expediency." Truth is required regardless of the harm to the liar or
innocent third parties. KANT, ON A SUPPOSED RIGHT TO LIE FROM ALTRUISTIC MOTIVES,
reprinted in S. BOK, supra note 161, at 267, 269. Although Aquinis finds all lies to be wrong as
they interfere with communication, joking or officious lies (those told for the well-being or
advantage of the listener) are less culpable than pernicious lies. T. AQUINIS, supra note 170, at
Art. II & III.
184. See, e.g., S. BOK, supra note 161, at 39-42; R. WRIGHT, supra note 13, at 95.
185. S. BOK, supra note 161, at 32-41. Veracity is a prima facie right either because of its
inherent goodness, or because it enhances autonomy. See supra note 159 and accompanying
text. Bok notes that deception by professionals is particularly disfavored because given the
opportunities to deceive, the extreme loss of trust, and possibility of imitation and deceptive
countermeasures, it is highly likely deceptive practices of that nature will spread and harm the
community. S. BOK, supra note 161, at 119.
186. S. BOK, supra note 161, at 86-87. Liars tend to minimize the impact of lies both
because of their inherent bias and their reduced sensitivity to moral issues. See supra note 174
and accompanying text; S. BOK, supra note 161, at 83, 120.
187. Bok agrees with Hume that moral justifications must be considered with reference to
the common view of all. S. BOK, supra note 161, at 91 (citing D. HUME, AN ENQUIRY CON-
CERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS, in HUME'S MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 252
(H. Aiken ed. 1948)). Bok's use of the term "publicity" refers to Rawls' view that every moral
principle "must be capable of public statement and defense." Id. at 92 (citing J. RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 133 (1972)). Bok finds the requirement of publicity is perhaps particu-
larly critical to justifications of deception, because lies are inherently secretive. They are,
therefore, less likely to otherwise be brought to the attention of the public for debate than are
more openly performed controversial acts. Id.
188. Id. at 108-09. See also supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
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stances that it probably will not encourage others to lie.189 Thus, it may be
appropriate to deceive the client regarding confidentiality so that he will dis-
close his immediate plans to harm another; thereupon, the lawyer must try
to stop him. If harm is imminent, as where a client has a history of violent
behavior, such deception may be justified.190
This hypothesis, however, cannot serve as a blanket justification for decep-
tion. Deception about possible disclosure occurs from the commencement of
the relationship, when it is unclear whether anyone's interests are impli-
cated, let alone an innocent third party's interest in bodily integrity. Thus,
no one evaluates the alternatives, and, furthermore, no one can determine
the likelihood or severity of an infringement of a third party's rights at the
time of the deception. Thus, the lawyer cannot evaluate the strength of the
justification for the deception at the time it occurs.' 9 ' Moreover, a policy of
not disclosing limits on confidences, if intentional, goes beyond the isolated
189. S. BOK, supra note 161, at 108-09. Cf T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note
25, at 312-13 (prima facie obligation of veracity and respect for autonomy, as well as implica-
tions of a long term threat to relationship of trust mandate a search for alternatives); id. at 335-
41 (using utilitarian balance, authors show that the right to confide may be outweighed by
harm to third parties where that harm is both probable and severe; professionals should seek
alternatives where possible).
190. Although the rights of third parties are most clearly at issue in such a case, the infor-
mation is also more material to the client, and of a more private nature than some confidences.
Perhaps as a result, some commentators believe that patients who are tested for AIDS should
be informed of the doctor's responsibility to report results, and of the economic and social
consequences that may follow disclosure. See, e.g., McDonald, Ethical Problems for Physicians
Raised by AIDS and HIV Infection: Conflicting Legal Obligations of Confidentiality and Dis-
closure, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 557, 588 (1989) (duty to advise clients in high risk categories);
Swartz, AIDS Testing and Informed Consent, 13 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW 607, 613-15
(1988) (doctors should explain implications to health and lifestyle); Weldon-Linne, Weldon-
Linne, & Murphy, AIDS- Virus Antibody Testing. Issues of Informed Consent and Patient Con-
fidentiality, 75 ILL. B.J. 206, 210 (1986) (duty to warn of ramifications of testing, including
possibility of disclosure). See People v. Younghanz, 156 Cal. App. 3d 811, 202 Cal. Rptr. 907
(1984) (psychologist must inform patient of duty to report child abuse in order to protect
patient privacy). An argument could be made, however, that where harm is clear, such as
where patients bring a child who is a victim of child abuse to an emergency room, the doctor
could refrain from informing parents of his duty to disclose in order to assure the child's
treatment and perhaps to avoid future abuse.
191. Bok states that any attempt to establish priorities or rights in the abstract is bound to
fail. For example:
[W]hile it is obscure to claim that weight and length conflict in the abstract, there are
concrete cases where both cannot be satisfied, where you cannot get a thing the
length you want and the weight you want, as where you need fifteen yards of heavy
chain but only have the strength to carry home five pounds of it. In the same way,
you cannot always make a choice, or expect others to make it, which achieves both
the fairness and the beneficence you desire. Moral principles, just like length and
weight, represent different dimensions by which we structure experience and can
therefore present conflicts in concrete cases but never in the abstract. It is for this
reason that the search for priority rules among moral principles in the abstract is
[Vol. 39:441
Limits On Confidentiality
incident that will not encourage others to lie. Rather, it reflects an ongoing
practice of deception.19 2
Finally, the deception may have no countervailing justification. First,
some clients have no intention of harming others, so deception is unneces-
sary. Second, the argument that deception is necessary assumes that, absent
a belief that secrets will be held inviolate, the client will never tell the lawyer,
who will then be unable to prevent harm.1 93 In fact, some clients may tell
their lawyers anyway, either because they feel the need to confess or because
they recognize the necessity of candor to assure competent legal representa-
tion.194 Moreover, a lawyer who has not engaged in deception is in a better
position to exercise moral suasion.195
If deception cannot be justified by the argument that a lawyer may thereby
be in a position to avoid harm to a third party, it follows that it may not be
justified by the possibility that a lawyer may avoid harm to herself if her
competence is challenged or if she must collect her fee. 196 In fact, if such
doomed to fail; one might as well search for such priority rules among pounds, yards,
and hours in the abstract.
S. BOK, supra note 161, at 77-78.
192. In the context of "self-defensive lies," Bok observes that a practice of lying can perme-
ate all one does, perhaps reaching the point where one is "living a lie." Id. at 79. She adds
that "[p]rofessionals involved in collective practices of deceit" thereby renounce ordinary as-
sumptions about their own honesty and the honesty of others. Id.
193. Three-quarters of the lawyers surveyed in Professor Zacharias's study believe that
confidentiality helped them dissuade a client from wrongdoing. Zacharias, supra note 6, at
381. Professor Zacharias notes that these responses leave two questions unanswered: whether
the lawyers could have gotten the information at all, absent promises of confidentiality, and
whether disclosure exemptions would cause clients to hide information they otherwise would
disclose. Id. Most of those surveyed believed they would get the same information from cli-
ents if they did not advise clients about confidentiality. Id. at 385.
194. Subin, supra note 10, at 1163-64; Zacharias, supra note 6, at 369.
195. See supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text.
196. Those who accept the notion that a client who sues the lawyer or will not pay a fee is
an "unjust aggressor" might argue that it is appropriate to lie to enemies or in one's own
defense to counteract the evil of the client. As suggested above, not all such clients are unjust
aggressors. See supra note 131. Moreover, such claims are particularly susceptible to bias:
Because claims to fairness involve deeply personal views about what one deserves or
what is one's right, they are extraordinarily prone to misinterpretation and bias. In-
justice, exploitation, the disparity of power - these are held to excuse innumerable
lies. Those who believe they are exploited hold that this fact by itself justifies dishon-
esty in rectifying the equilibrium; those who have the upper hand often feel justified
in using deceit so as to maintain that equilibrium.
S. BOK, supra note 161, at 83 (emphasis added). Where "enemies" are concerned, paranoia
may exacerbate bias. Id. at 139. Finally, a claim that an act is right due to the status of
another as an enemy is less likely than most to satisfy the requirement of publicity:
The language of enmity and rivalry, as Hume indicated ... is private language not
suited to moral inquiry. If we want to produce excuses for lying to someone, these
excuses should be capable of persuading reasonable persons, not merely some partic-
19901
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scenarios arise more often than the possibility of harm to third parties, the
potential that a lawyer might use confidences in those cases is even more
material, and hence especially deceptive, to the client. The attorney should
therefore inform the client of that possibility.
Lawyers may fear the chilling effect of disclosing the limits on confidenti-
ality. Other than avoidance of harm to the lawyer or third parties, the only
danger of such a "chill" is that clients may not confide information the attor-
ney feels is critical to competent representation. One can analogize such an
argument to the roundly criticized, paternalistic notion held by some physi-
cians that a patient should not be told of risks because he might not submit
to a medical procedure that is "good" for him. 19 7 Thus, so long as the client
understands that the lawyer may be hampered by a lack of information, the
choice of whether to disclose belongs to the client. 98
ular public locked in hostility to a particular group. Entering into hostilities is, in a
sense, to give up the ability to shift perspectives. But even those who give up the
language of morality during a period of hostility and adopt that of strategy instead,
may do well to remember Mark Twain's words: 'When in doubt, tell the truth. It
will confound your enemies and astound your friends.'
Id. at 145.
197. The desire to do what is best for the client is a laudable one, based on the principle of
beneficence, or providing benefits (which includes both prevention of harm and promotion of
welfare). T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 25, at 194-95. However, failure to
provide informed consent for the client's "own good" creates a conflict between the principles
of beneficence and autonomy. Id. at 210. In medical ethics, it is generally recognized that
beneficence must give way to promotion of autonomy, at least where the patient is competent.
The primary goal of health care in general is to maximize each patient's well-being.
However, merely acting in a patient's best interests without recognizing the individ-
ual as the pivotal decisionmaker would fail to respect each person's interest in self-
determination .... When the conflicts that arise between a competent patient's self-
determination and his or her apparent well-being remain unresolved after adequate
deliberation, a competent patient's self-determination is and usually should be given
greater weight than other people's views on that individual's well-being....
Respect for the self-determination of competent patients is of special impor-
tance .... The patient [should have] the final authority to decide.
Id. at 210, (quoting President's Comm. for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine & Bi-
omedical & Behavioral Research 26-27, 44 (1983)). Perhaps in those situations where the client
appears especially nervous and mistrustful (assuming the attorney believes no potentially dam-
aging disclosures are imminent), the attorney may be justified in waiting until she develops a
rapport with the client and can speak calmly with him. Cf T. MAPPES & J. ZEMBATY, supra
note 13, at 55 (short term paternalism appropriate where it is necessary to assure autonomy in
the long run). But see infra note 200; T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 25, at 312-
13 (caution must be exercised and deception practiced only in limited circumstances without
alternatives); Luban, supra note 146, at 465 (three conditions necessary to justify paternalism
are that individual's decisionmaking capacity must be impaired, the constraint must be as
limited and temporary as possible, and the threatened damage must be severe and irreversible).
198. Subin, supra note 10, at 1167 (no "mischief" if clients keep such matters to them-




D. The Content of Warnings About Limits to Confidentiality
One obvious question that arises is how much information the lawyer
should share. Providing the client with an equivalent of a law school educa-
tion by explaining all of the nuances of confidentiality rules seems unneces-
sary and, in fact, would be counterproductive. 99 However, the attorney
should give a general explanation of the duty of confidentiality and its major
exceptions. In that way, the client will have enough information to enable
him to ask intelligent questions as specific confidentiality issues arise.200 If it
becomes clear to the attorney as the representation progresses that the client
needs more specific information because an exception may apply, she should
raise the issue again.
Some may argue that the question of what is material to a client varies
depending on the kind of representation the lawyer offers and the nature of
confidences shared. Thus, they might add, no general requirement of disclo-
sure should arise. Three variables might be considered in determining when
exceptions to confidentiality are material.
First, the lawyer could evaluate the relative sophistication of her client.
Some clients, such as corporations, may be aware of limits to confidentiality.
Arguably, knowledgeable clients would not require warnings to make an in-
formed decision.20 '
199. Confidentiality rules are varied and confusing. See Zacharias, supra note 6, at 365.
Studies disclose that patients given too much information at one time do not absorb the infor-
mation received. Thus, to be effective, the process of obtaining informed consent must be an
ongoing one. See C. LIDZ, supra note 136, at 318, 330-34; see infra note 213. As Beauchamp
and Childress explain, however, the fact that a party cannot know or communicate the "whole
truth" is no excuse for deception. The "whole truth" is useful only in the way the concept of
infinity is useful: it may never be reached but can be the ideal that professionals seek to reach
and against which they can measure their performance. T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS,
supra note 25, at 313.
200. Such a continuing dialogue will assure that consent is truly informed. See supra note
199. Moreover, it is likely that honesty about the limits of confidentiality will increase trust:
"The client may more readily accept [the attorney] as an ally within the defined boundaries,
both because the lawyer has exhibited integrity and because the limitations on the alliance
make the total package more believable." Zacharias, supra note 6, at 368. See also Burt, supra
note 23, at 10 15-16 (attorney and client will transcend initial mistrust by discussing limitations
on attorney loyalty). As Professor Shaffer observes, an ethic of mutual care and moral dis-
course between lawyer and client is the preferred alternative to unexamined deference to client
goals, or to paternalism. Shaffer, supra note 150, at 253. See infra note 213 and accompanying
text. Methods involving deception or keeping the client in ignorance cannot promote such a
relationship. Shaffer, supra note 150, at 247.
201. Professor Zacharias did not question corporate officers regarding their views of the
attorney-client privilege. See Zacharias, supra note 6, at 380. It is safe to say that corporations
acting through in-house corporate counsel may have a more sophisticated understanding of the
privilege. And, on the whole, it may be assumed that corporate officers are better educated
and more sophisticated than some other clients. However, corporate officers do not inevitably
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Next, the lawyer could evaluate the likelihood that information within an
exception may be confided. 2 2 For example, lawyers representing multiple
parties in a transaction currently are required to inform the parties that no
attorney-client privilege exists regarding communications between any of
them and the lawyer.20 3 This rule could be premised on a belief that a
breakdown in the relationship is foreseeable, so clients should be aware of
the potential consequences.2 Similarly, the likelihood of conflict renders it
mandatory that lawyers should advise an officer of a corporation that coun-
sel for the entity does not represent officers' interests; 20 5 it has been sug-
gested that a warning should include a statement that the attorney may
disclose harmful information to the company if an officer shares it with
her.20 6 The same rationale might be used to support a contention that law-
understand the consequences of sharing confidences. Cf. E. F. Hutton v. Brown, 305 F. Supp.
371, 400 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (officer of corporation did not waive right to disqualify corporate
counsel who also acted on his behalf by allowing counsel to represent both him and corpora-
tion at hearings, because he, as a layman, did not necessarily understand the consequences of
dual representation). See infra note 205.
202. Beauchamp and Childress evaluate both the probability of harm and its magnitude in
their discussion of when to accept risks. T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 25, at
234-38. For a discussion of the gravity of the risk of not disclosing limits to clients, see infra
text accompanying notes 219-21. Such a test is not unlike the "Learned Hand balancing test,"
developed in United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1969). See also
Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 645 (1985) (determina-
tion of appropriate ethics rule should include a consideration of magnitude and likelihood of
harm).
203. See MODEL RULES, supra note 11, at Rule 2.2 comment (no attorney-client privilege
among joint clients; clients should be informed).
204. See id. (discussing potential for failure of joint representation).
205. See MODEL CODE, supra note 3, at EC 5-19; MODEL RULES, supra note 11, at Rule
1. 13 comment (lawyer should advise officer he does not represent officer).
206. As a general rule, the corporation, not the officers, holds the attorney-client privilege,
and a lawyer may disclose information regarding conversations between counsel and a corpo-
rate official if the corporation consents, regardless of whether the officer does. See, e.g., In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 575
F. Supp. 777, (N.D. Ga. 1983); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 1029,
1033-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
In fact, some courts have concluded that the corporation may waive the privilege for the
officer even where the lawyer has been deemed to have performed dual representation of the
officer and corporation, unless the client makes it clear that he is seeking advice in an individ-
ual capacity. See, e.g., In the Matter of Bevill, Bresler & Shulman Asset Management Corp.,
805 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 575 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ga.
1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 434 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Mich. 1978). Shifting the burden
to the client is inconsistent with the notion that lawyers must fully disclose the ramifications of
dual representation and obtain an informed consent where a conflict of interest arises. See
supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text; E. F. Hutton v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 400
(S.D. Tex. 1969) (client did not waive right to disqualify lawyers who concurrently represented
him and corporation by allowing joint representation, because attorney may not shift to client
the obligation to disclose nature and consequences of such representation). Professor Drew
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yers should warn criminal clients about exceptions to confidentiality for fu-
ture crimes or fraud.
Finally, the character of potential confidences to be shared could be con-
sidered. The client might want to know that highly private or harmful infor-
mation may be the subject of disclosure, but may not care about less
sensitive information.2"7 Thus, it could be argued, clients do not need to
know that fee information may be shared as it is usually quite general and
not harmful to the client if disclosed. Of course, use of this factor would
lead to the conclusion that the client would want to know that information
about crimes or frauds might be disclosed, or that the lawyer may disclose
information inculpatory to the client to exculpate herself.
Perhaps a consideration of these variables would lead to a more precise
answer to the question whether the lawyer should discuss exclusions to con-
fidentiality rules. There are, however, two serious problems with using such
an analysis.
First, the factors would seem to suggest that selective disclosure is appro-
priate. In fact, partial information may be much more misleading than no
information at all2° s and would give the client misplaced security regarding
those matters not raised in his attorney's carefully worded speech.
Second, use of the factors tends to treat clients as groups rather than as
individuals, which is contrary to the central notion of the informed consent
requirement.2"9 Rather than enhancing autonomy of the individual client in
an individual case, the lawyer relying on the factors above runs the risk of
creating "a standardized person to whom he attributes standardized
ends"'2 10 and "acting for the hypothetical client rather than the one before
him." '211 This approach depersonalizes the client and treats him as an ob-
Kershen advocates that corporations be estopped from asserting the privilege unless the lawyer
informs the officer not only that she represents the entity rather than the officer, but also that
information the client shares with counsel is not privileged. Kershen, Ethical Issues for Corpo-
rate Counsel in Internal Investigations. A Problem Analyzed, 13 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 1, 12,
22-23 (1988); MODEL RULES, supra note 11, at Rule 1.13 comment (lawyer should inform
officer that discussions may not be privileged).
207. See Moore, supra note 12, at 195 (suggesting that information closer to the "core"
person should receive additional protection). See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
208. "Half-truths" may support an action for fraud. See P. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON
ON TORTS 737-39 (5th Ed. 1984).
209. See Andersen, supra note 136, at 233 (objective standard for materiality threatens
autonomy by depersonalizing clients). See also supra note 147.
210. Lehman, The Pursuit of a Client's Interest, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1078, 1087 (1977). See
Andersen, supra note 136, at 233 (using the "reasonable client" approach to materiality as-
sumes that clients fit into categories and that it is permissible to treat them alike).
211. Lehman, supra note 210, at 1087.
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ject.212 To assure true autonomy, the lawyer must not decide what she
thinks the client wants or needs, but must explore the client's actual goals
with him.213
As a result, while the above factors might be useful, they cannot be dispos-
itive. The lawyer must engage the client in an ongoing, personal discussion
to enable her to determine what matters to the client. Perhaps that discus-
sion could begin with a statement such as the following one, which is drafted
to apply to a criminal client:
You should know that I work for you and that I consider it very
important to keep your confidences. The attorney-client privilege
essentially means that I cannot be forced to disclose information
about discussions we have. For example, judges sometimes can or-
der lawyers to disclose information, but they can't make me tell
them about whether you committed the crime.2 14 You should
know about some limits to the privilege, however. If I learn that
you will lie or have lied on the witness stand, I must report that.21 5
I am also allowed to report if you tell me you are going to commit
a crime. I may also report limited information to defend against
claims made against me or to collect my fee, but I am allowed to
report only that information necessary to meet those goals. For
example, if we fight about my fee, I might be able to show my
billing records, but I couldn't just reveal all the things I know
about you. Although there are times I may feel it is necessary to
212. See supra notes 209-10. Professor Shaffer counsels against the creation of a profes-
sional relationship where the client is merely an object, and he advocates a more cooperative
model. See supra note 152.
213. Professor Andersen asserts that professionals should not second guess clients and
make assumptions about how they might react but instead should engage clients in a dialogue
to determine which questions need further explanation and what gaps in the client's under-
standing exist. Andersen, supra note 136, at 233 n.32. Professor Lehman concurs, observing
that many clients do not have a clear set of preferences when first seeking legal counsel, and
that lawyers who do not engage in a dialogue tend to assume that legal or financial considera-
tions are of paramount importance, when the client may have another view. Lehman, supra
note 210, at 1080; 1088-89. Lehman concludes that "the lawyer needs to be careful to discover
what it is the client is really about, [and] to give the fullest possible opportunity for her inter-
ests to be explored .. " Id. at 1089. See Luban, supra note 146, at 479 (we should not assume
eccentric opinion is an incompetent one and should respect it so long as any facts exist upon
which opinion may be based). Of course, using an objective client standard is better than
focusing totally on the professional's view; many informed consent cases in the medical context
use an objective standard, See supra note 15 1.
214. In another setting, the lawyer might say the court cannot force her to disclose her
client's negligence, breach of contract, or other past act which is the subject of the
representation.
215. This statement assumes the lawyer lives in a jurisdiction where such disclosures are
mandated. See supra note 67.
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report information, I want to remind you that I take the privilege
very seriously and would never lightly decide to share information.
Those reading this suggested statement might believe all of this sounds
terrible and the client would view the lawyer as greedy and self-protective.
2'16
This response is like shooting the messenger rather than wishing the message
were different. The ethics rules provide for these exceptions, and if they
sound as if ethical priorities are misplaced, the rules should be changed.
2 17
So long as they exist, however, the client should be aware of them. Of
course, absent modification of the rules, one alternative to revealing the
more self-serving of those exceptions is that an individual attorney may de-
cide as a matter of personal ethics not to warn regarding those exceptions
because she intends never to invoke them. In this way, no deception
occurs.
2 1 8
The final question is what consequences a failure to inform of exceptions
should have. If a client does not have information reasonably necessary to
make informed decisions, the lawyer has violated Model Rule 1.4(b) and
should be subject to discipline. Moreover, the client could bring a cause of
action for lack of informed consent if he would find the information with-
held material to his decisionmaking.2 19 If there are no actual damages flow-
ing from the lack of informed consent, at least nominal damages and
possibly attorney fees should be assessed.22° Moreover, punitive damages
may be appropriate where reckless disregard is shown. 22' Thus, for both
moral and legal reasons, the lawyer should presume the appropriateness of
warning clients concerning the limits to confidentiality.
V. CONCLUSION
It is unlikely that failure to inform about limits on confidentiality will
result in constitutional violations or civil liability if disclosures are made.
However, an attorney practices deception upon a trusting client when she
216. It may also be argued that the client may be deterred from making disclosures. To the
extent this is an exercise in client autonomy, this response is appropriate. See supra note 198
and accompanying text. To the extent it may frighten an individual so much he is unable to
make a decision, it may be morally justifiable to delay disclosures about limits, but only if
several requirements are met. See supra note 197.
217. See supra notes 116-34 and accompanying text.
218. This appears to be the approach Professor Amsterdam advocates. See supra note 8.
An attorney may also decide as a matter of personal ethics to refrain from disclosing perjury,
but she thereby runs the risk of violating an ethics rule and subjecting herself to discipline. See
supra note 67.
219. See supra notes 135-55 and accompanying text.
220. Andersen, supra note 136, at 230.
221. Id. at 249-50.
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misstates or refuses to disclose those circumstances that constitute excep-
tions to the attorney-client privilege. Deception has the immediate impact of
reducing client autonomy and impairing the trust relationship, while the
rights that deception might vindicate are varied and speculative. Thus, an
attorney is morally required, and should be legally required, to be forthright
with a client and allow the client to choose whether the risks of disclosure
outweigh its benefits.
